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This report examines the current role of facilities planning in force protection. It
concentrates on a specific planning technique, Defensible Space, also called Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), as a method that planners and
facilities personnel can use to contribute to the force protection of a facility (Jefferey,
1977, Crowe, 1991). The following four areas are included:
1. An examination ofCPTED, it's potential use in Force Protection, and the
development of guidelines for it's future use.
2. An examination of significant acts ofterrorism to see if and how CPTED
guidelines could have been applied to increase target security.
3. Examples ofhow CPTED guidelines were applied to improve Force Protection at
Joint Interagency Task Force - East (JIATF-EAST).




The principles ofCPTED are examined in detail. The historical background for
CPTED, and security in general, are examined in order to help explain how these
concepts were developed. Modern security theory and techniques are reviewed in order
to emphasize the difference between these theories and the CPTED principles. The
psychological aspects ofCPTED theory are also examined in order to help explain the
principles.
This section includes a discussion about terrorism and how it differs from the
Navy definition of force protection and from other crimes. Significant acts ofterrorism
are examined in order to project if and how the CPTED guidelines could have been
applied to increase target security. The following incidents are discussed:
• U.S. Marine barracks, Beirut, Lebanon
• Khobar Towers, Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia
• Federal Building, Oklahoma City
• U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Although only the first two targets were on military installations, the other two examples
are valuable because they illustrate recent patterns ofterrorist attacks at U.S. and foreign
facilities.
A set of guidelines for the future use ofCPTED in Force Protection are developed
based on the planning model. The JIATF-EAST project is used as an example ofhow to
implement the developed CPTED guidelines. An in depth discussion ofthe project
includes: (1) the process that was used to develop the design; (2) an overview ofthe
existing facility; (3) existing opportunities and constraints and (4) the design solutions
and their CPTED basis.

The review of current Navy policy provides a baseline that shows the present role
of facilities planning in force protection. Basic security policy is also briefly examined.
The principles and techniques ofCPTED discussed earlier are then compared to the
current Navy Policy on Force Protection. Based on this comparison a general set of
recommendations are developed which can be used by planners and facility personnel to





Report Impetus - JIATFE Project
This report was inspired by a project that was conducted in the fall 1997
Defensible Space Course at the University of Florida. This project was undertaken for
the Joint Interagency Task Force - East (JIATF-EAST). Located on Truman Annex at
Naval Air Station Key West, FL, JIATF-EAST is a U.S. government agency with the
mission to detect and monitor aerial and maritime drug trafficking in the Atlantic,
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zones. The base security personnel are concerned
about the potential oftruck and car bomb attacks and the lack of standoff distance around
their four-building complex.
Due to an open base policy at Truman Annex and the inclusion ofrecreational
activities at the facility, the base personnel were interested in a design that would be more
aesthetically pleasing than traditional security methods. The security officer contacted
the University and proposed that the architecture college do a plan for the base. Due to
the security aspects ofthe plan, the project was given to the Defensible Space class, with
the support and assistance of an undergraduate Landscape Architecture Studio.
The objective ofthe JIATF-East project was to devise a plan that would increase
force protection on the base and at the JIATF-East facility through the use ofCPTED

principles and techniques. Given the base's desire for an aesthetically pleasing design,
the CPTED concepts seemed an ideal solution for the project.
The Role of Planning in Force Protection
The JIATF-East project illustrates that force protection is a priority in DOD that
planners will have to take into consideration when they are designing or upgrading
facilities. Facilities planning can play a major role in force protection now and in the
future. Planning allows for the incorporation ofprotection strategies at the beginning of
the design process. Through proper planning, costly retrofitting can be avoided because
activity placement and natural design techniques can be used to achieve the same
purposes that only expensive technical equipment can achieve in some existing situations.
Planners and facility personnel are in a position to be able to develop a
comprehensive physical plan for an entire facility. A comprehensive plan is inherently
more effective than one that is done randomly in small pieces. Planners also have the
training to be able to look at and understand the role ofthe facility in context with
adjacent areas. This is valuable due to the increasing importance ofthe interface between
bases and their surrounding communities (Alexander, 1986).
CPTED Overview
The planning and security communities have been using CPTED for a number of
years to help reduce more common crimes in business and housing areas through the
effective use and design ofthe built environment. Only recently have the concepts been
applied to the crime ofterrorism. These "environmental approaches" to crime prevention

were made popular by Oscar Newman in his book "Defensible Space" (Newman, 1972)
and then later elaborated upon by other researchers such as Taylor, Crowe, Clarke, and P.
Von Brintinghorn. CPTED includes several basic principles that can have different titles
depending on the source used. In general they consist of.
1. Territoriality - suggests that physical design can contribute to a sense of control and
proprietorship in users (Newman, 1972).
2. Surveillance - "eyes on the street," the goal ofwhich is to keep intruders under
observation (Newman, 1972).
3. Access control - has a goal of decreasing crime opportunity by denying access or
making it more difficult and creating the perception of risk (Crowe, 1991).
4. Activity Placement - involves design ofphysical space in the context ofthe needs of
the space's users, the designated normal use ofthe space, and the predicted behavior
ofboth users and offenders (Crowe, 1991).
5. Maintenance - encourages the upkeep and continual re-evaluation ofthe systems.
This principle is also concerned with the image and milieu ofthe area, which are
intended to combat the "broken window" effect (Newman, 1972, Wilson and Kelling,
1982).
These concepts are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. CPTED concentrates
on using the natural environment to manipulate behavior instead ofrelying on electrical
or mechanical devices, or additional human resources, although theses latter methods are
not ruled out. The CPTED emphasis on design and use differs from the traditional target
hardening approach that focuses on denying access to target through mechanical and

electrical devices and other physical or artificial barriers (locks, alarms, fences, gates).
Traditional target hardening can lead to constraints on use, access and enjoyment ofthe
site, and it overlooks natural access control and surveillance. CPTED uses traditional
target hardening methods only when they do not unduly impair use (Crowe, 1991).
Justification of Project
CPTED concepts are easy design tools for a planner or facilities person to use.
CPTED concepts can also meet some external goals that traditional security methods do
not. There are a variety ofreasons personnel may be hesitant about implementing
traditional methods of security at their facilities. Reasons for not using traditional
methods may include aesthetics, psychological effects, political sensitivity, or simply,
high costs.
Image
Aesthetics is one area in which CPTED concepts can be more useful than
traditional security techniques. The appearance of a base or facility is a reflection ofthe
commanding officer (CO) in charge o£ and the people working on, the base. Pure
functionality is no longer the only concern, the appearance ofbases and facilities has
become increasingly important. Landscaping on bases is increasingly prevalent. Many
CO's come from ships and so the term "ship-shape" has significant meaning for them.
CO's expect the bases under their command to have a neat and orderly
appearance and to reflect positively on themselves and on the Navy in general. For
example, on the Norfolk Naval Base, construction sites on main thoroughfares cannot be

surrounded by chain link fences. The base commander requires high wood fencing,
similar to that used in residential backyards, in order to thoroughly hide the sites. Trash
on the base is also strictly controlled, with teams of sailors patrolling the base at regular
intervals to make sure everything is clean. New, more architecturally interesting
buildings are slowly replacing older, nondescript structures. Also, an effort is made to
regularly paint older buildings to avoid the appearance that they are run down. Indeed,
this same emphasis on aesthetics was a factor driving the JIATF-EAST design and
planning efforts, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Quality ofLife
Another way in which CPTED can be an improvement over traditional security is
in the Quality ofLife (QOL) of military and civilian personnel in the Navy, which has
been of increasing emphasis in recent years. As the U.S. economy improves, the military
has found it must compete for qualified and competent personnel. The dissatisfaction of
personnel in the past over living conditions on the bases has lead to improved standards
in housing, recreation and facilities in general. Recently, new modular office furniture
has been replacing furniture that has been used for decades in most offices. There is now
a general concern for the morale and welfare of military and government workers and
their families.
Overuse offences, barriers, walls, gates, and cameras, popular in traditional
security configurations, can make personnel feel as though they are working in a prison
like environment, with little privacy or freedom More recent QOL philosophy tends to
discourage this type of setting. CPTED uses natural elements such as landscaping and

activity placement instead offences and cameras to increase security. The use ofthese
CPTED principles can do much to improve the working atmosphere ofpersonnel on
Naval facilities.
Open Base Policy
Another recent Navy phenomenon is the Open Base Policy on many ofthe bases
around the country, including Truman Annex, in Key West, the site ofthe JIATF-EAST
facility. This policy was introduced because of cutbacks in both military manpower and
budget areas, and to encourage more open relationships with the areas outside the
facilities. However, this policy has increased concerns regarding both security and the
interface between the Navy and the surrounding civilian community.
There has been a push in recent years for Navy facilities to promote positive
relationships with the surrounding communities. Most bases now have Public Relations
Offices and officers whose job it is to help military facilities interface positively with the
public. Because the appearances ofthe bases are a reflection ofthe Navy as a whole, it
will be increasingly important to create a friendly image in order to maintain a good
relationship with neighboring communities. Timothy Crowe, in his book on CPTED,
warns how the overuse oftechnology as a means of security can create a "fortress effect"
that destroys the surrounding land uses and create a "no-man's" land (Crowe, 1991). By
using a more natural approach, CPTED techniques can maintain security while reducing
its visual impact.
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772/5 section will examine actual CPTED and defensible space principles and
techniques. As aprecursor to this, the historical background ofdefense and security will
be reviewed, as will the historical roots ofenvironmentalpsychology. Modern
environmentalpsychology will be discussed as it relates to CPTED. Modern security
theory and techniques will also be discussed, emphasizing its differencesfrom CPTED
strategies.
Background
The concepts behind CPTED are not new. They are based on some ofthe basic
strategies about defense and physical defense systems that date back to the times ofthe
first villages in Neolithic times (Mumford, 1960). The concept of defense is one ofthe
oldest reasons for subsequent town and city development (Kosto£ 1992). The use of
design and space management to manipulate human behavior is over 5000 years old
(Crowe, 1991). CPTED follows many ofthese ancient concepts of defense and of
"environmental psychology".
Historical Examples ofDefense and Environmental Psychology
In the times before advanced technology, man relied on physical defense methods
to defend his cities. Throughout ancient times and into the Middle Ages, defense and
economics were interrelated relative to the development of cities. The first villages were
formed for protection and for the storage of food surplus. Even in the first primitive

villages, the notion ofthe edge and the boundary was important to denote where the
village began and ended. Early settlements used defensive siting, such as locating on the
top of a hill or next to a river, and manmade barriers, such as earthen berms, as their
methods of defense. Symbolic boundaries were made tangible through the building of
walls, such as those around the village in Figure 2.1. As a civilization became more
advanced, its defensive barriers became more complex.
& & &
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Figure 2.1: Depiction of an ancient walled village.
Source: Webber, Comprehensive Planning.
Medieval walled cities, such as the one in Figure 2.2, were good examples ofthe
use ofbarrier systems to deter or delay an enemy. The curving streets in medieval cities
were also designed for defense. In medieval city design, the center ofthe walled ring was
the most important portion ofthe city often housing the lord or the church or both, and it
was to be protected by layers ofimpediments and barriers. The wall was one ofthese
layers and the streets were a second one. Some cities had several layers ofwalls. This
layering of defenses is also an important concept in modern security.
S

Figure 2.2: Depiction of a medieval walled city.
Source: Webber, Comprehensive Planning.
In many ancient cities the center was not only the area that was the most
protected, it was also the symbolic center ofthe city. It represented the seat ofpower or
the seat of religion (or both) and the closer an area was to it the more important that area
was. This hierarchy of importance around the central location ofpalaces, temples, and
churches is a very basic example of environmental psychology. Height was also used in
many ofthese cities to indicate importance and position. A more complex example ofthe
use ofenvironmental psychology is from the ancient Greeks in Sicily, who would design
their temples to convey an absence of light in order to produce fear in the local
population (Crowe, 1991).
Other examples ofpsychological design methods are included in Chinese and
Indian tradition of city design, in which the city form had great religious significance and
represented a model ofthe universe, the gods, and man's relationship to them. These
ancient cultures influenced and controlled their population through their myths and
9

beliefs and the form oftheir cities reinforced these aspects oftheir society. Many
Chinese and Asian cities were laid out as a series ofboxes that were divided and
subdivided to represent the hierarchy ofpower in their societies. In the Chinese example,
shown in Figure 2.3, the separation of religious and public functions may have
foreshadowed the modern concept of zoning. Figure 2.4 illustrates the layered approach


















Figure 2.3: Plan ofChang'an in China.




Figure 2.4: Approach to the Imperial
Audience Hall in Peking.
Source: A Theory ofGood City Form,
Kevin Lynch, 1981.
In India it was the tradition that to enclose and control the evil forces of chaos, the
cities were designed in the form of a mandala (see Figure 2.5), which was a set of
enclosing rings divided into squares. The center point ofthe city was considered the
10

most powerful and hence was to be protected from casual or non-invited incursion.
Madurai, India (Figure 2.6), is a good example ofthis type of city design (Lynch, 1981).
The Indian mandala is a historic example of environmental psychology.




Figure 2.5: Indian mandala.
Source: A Theory ofGood City Form
,
Kevin Lynch, 1981.
Figure 2.6: Madurai, India.
Source: A Theory ofGood City Form.
Kevin Lynch, 1981.
Modern Techniques of Security
Although many modern security techniques are very different from historical
methods, many ofthe underlying philosophies are the same. The goal of security is
detection, delay and response (NAVFAC, 1991). Therefore, physical security should
attempt to make access to a target so difficult that an intruder will hesitate to choose it as
his goal. And, ifthe intruder does attempt to pursue his target, he should be able to be
easily detected and apprehended (Schukz, 1978.)
To limit access to a target, modern security theory stresses a layered approach, as
illustrated in Figure 2.7. Its similarities to the design ofthe ancient Chinese and Indian
cities is obvious. The more layers ofphysical security around a target, the harder it will
11

be to reach. Making a target more difficult to reach should decrease the likelihood that it
will be pursued as a target. Detection is achieved through surveillance and good
visibility. Detection increased the probability of apprehension.
Figure 2.7: Layered Approach to Modern Security.
Source: ASIS PS Committee Workshop, 1997.
Physical security is an element of crime prevention. The National Crime
Prevention institute defines crime prevention as "the anticipation, recognition and
appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it (the
risk)" (Crowe, 1991, pg. 23). Modern security theory does recognize that perfect or
absolute security can never be fully attained. 'There is no object so well protected that it
cannot be stolen, damaged, destroyed, or observed by unauthorized eyes" (Schultz, 1978,
Pg- 1).
Crowe, in his book Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, suggests
that there are three types of security strategies:
12

Organized: labor intensive security for which cost is external to normal functions and
requirements ofthe space.
- Mechanical: capital or hardware intensive security where the cost is external to the
normal functions and requirements ofthe space.
- Natural: the integration of security and behavior concepts into the utilization of
human and physical resources (spatial definition, placement ofwork stations, location of
windows.)
CPTED, like other modern security techniques, uses the layered approach to
security as a basic concept. One ofthe main differences between CPTED and other
security techniques is that, while CPTED does use organized and mechanical strategies
where appropriate, it is mainly based on natural security strategies. Because of this,
CPTED techniques tend to be less expensive and more sustainable in the long run than
the more traditional methods of security which have their emphasis on organized and
mechanical security strategies.
Security design recognizes that there are three sets ofusers for any space or
facility, they are:
- normal users: persons who are supposed to be in a space
- abnormal users: persons who are not supposed to be in a space
observers: person who have to be in a space to support the human function (Crowe,
1991)
The objective of designing for security is to design a space that will facilitate the normal





CPTED is a security concept that has been used for years by police departments
around the nation. It is an important part ofthe National Institute ofLaw Enforcement
and Criminal Justice Program's strategy in support oftheir goal to reduce crime and the
fear of crime and to improve the general quality of life (QOL) for the citizens it protects,
CPTED concepts have been successfully demonstrated in schools, commercial,
residential and transportation areas (Sherman, 1997).
Modern Environmental Psychology and CPTED Theory
CPTED is based in part on concepts of environmental psychology. The theory
behind environmental psychology is that there is a direct relationship between the
environment and human behavior. The CPTED concept "expands upon the assumption
that the proper design and effective use ofthe built environment can lead to a reduction in
the fear of crime and the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of
life." (Crowe, 1991, pg. 1). CPTED seeks to prevent certain specified crimes within a
specifically defined environment by manipulating variables that are closely related to the
environment itself (Crowe, 1991).
Natural Security Strategies
One ofthe major benefits ofCPTED is that it is less expensive to design crime
prevention into the way things are done than to order extra police, to order extra
equipment, or to retrofit structures. While the traditional emphasis of crime prevention
has been on mechanical and organized crime prevention techniques, CPTED seeks to
14

reduce the propensity ofthe physical environment to support criminal behavior. This
"natural" approach to crime prevention seeks to create access control and surveillance
through adapting the normal and routine uses ofthe environment (Crowe, 1991).
To promote the natural approach to crime prevention, CPTED incorporates three
fundamental overlapping strategies into space design and management.
Territorial reinforcement - Which includes natural surveillance and access control,
and emphasizes the enhancement of ownership and proprietary behaviors. (Crowe,
1991).
- Natural surveillance - For example, a strategically placed window or the placement
of an employee work station which will oversee a sensitive area or activity.
- Natural access control - For example, space should be designed so that people
immediately understand where they are allowed and are not allowed.
These strategies are the basis ofthe first three ofthe five main principles of
CPTED (Territoriality, Surveillance and Access Control) discussed in detail below. The
basic concept ofnaturalness is used in the development ofthe other two principles:
Activity Placement and Maintenance. Naturalness is "simply doing things you already
have to do, but doing them a little better" (Crowe, 1991 pg. 34). It is important to note
that although CPTED does emphasize using a natural approach where possible,
mechanical and organization approaches are also encouraged when they are appropriate.
15

The Five Main Principles
As noted in Chapter 1, the introduction to the paper, there are five traditional
CPTED principles used in the design of defensible space. They include territoriality,
surveillance, access control, activity placement, and maintenance. While these principles
sometimes go by different names, the underlying concepts are usually the same.
1 . Territoriality - is the use ofphysical design to create a sense ofuser ownership.
Territoriality suggests that physical design can contribute to a sense ofpersonal control or
proprietorship in users (Crowe, 1991). People usually take more interest in something
they own. Designing an environment that clearly delineates private or personal space
creates this sense of ownership. The appearance of ownership fosters behavior that
discourages unauthorized acts within a space. Owners have a vested interest and are
more likely to notice and challenge intruders (City ofTucson, 1989). Natural access
control and natural surveillance contribute to a sense ofterritoriality (Crowe, 1991).
Territoriality is based on the ideas of territorial definition and personal
ownership. Territorial definition is basically linking territory to a specific owner, or
owners. It can be achieved in a number ofways including:
- Signage (Crowe, 1991).
- Changes in pavement or floor type and texture (Newman, 1972).
- The use of symbolic boundaries such as fences, hedges, and other barriers that
delineate a border (Newman, 1972).
16

Provision of clearly marked transition zones between public and private space
(Newman, 1972).
Personal ownership can be achieved through activity placement and a number of
other methods. One ofthe important theories of territoriality is that the fewer people who
control an area the more likely they are to develop a sense of ownership for the area
(Newman, 1972). Other examples include:
Scheduling of events, such as sports and recreation, to get people to use the site
regularly.
- Designing an environment that clearly delineates private or personal space and
creating a hierarchy of spaces based on the movement from public to private domains.
- Using reserving parking places (Crowe, 1991 ).
2. Surveillance - means that the she can be naturally and easily observed. The goal
of surveillance is to keep intruders under observation (Crowe, 1991). An example of a
natural surveillance strategy would be the proper use and placement ofwindows as
contrasted with the use ofpolice patrols (organized strategy) or lighting and CCTV
(mechanical strategy), although these other strategies, particularly lighting, are
recommended when natural surveillance is not feasible.
Natural surveillance seeks to create an environment where accessible areas are easily
visible and where there is plenty of opportunity for people engaged in their normal
activities to see and observe the spaces around them (City ofTucson, 1989). Mechanical
17

and organizational approaches should also be considered when appropriate. Figure 2.8
illustrates the differences between a space designed for good natural surveillance and a
space that did not take natural surveillance into account.
Figure 2.8: Surveillance: The subway in Washington D.C. is open and encourages
natural surveillance (left), unlike the subway in New York City (right).
Source: ENR, 1995.
Activity placement is one ofthe primary ways to accomplish natural surveillance.
For example, placing desks so that they face windows or office entrances encourages the
viewing ofpeople entering the area or the site. When designing buildings, windows are
preferred over blank walls in order to provide "eyes on the street" and to avoid the





Other ways to increase natural surveillance include:
- Relocating gathering areas to encourage a view ofthe site.
Making sure that visibility is not physically impaired by obstacles such as high brush
and unnecessary walls.
- Providing appropriate lighting locations and levels.
3. Access control - is where access is limited to official users ofthe activity by
making non-user presence exceptional or out ofthe ordinary. Access control has a goal
of decreasing crime opportunity by denying access and creating the perception of risk




- natural (spatial definitions)
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Natural access control can include layers ofnon-mechanical/electrical barrier systems. It
can also include slowing down the approach to a target by means of traffic calming or
other techniques.
One ofthe main methods of achieving natural access control is through the use of
barriers, both physical and psychological. Note that it is also important to balance access
control with surveillance considerations, for example selecting a type of landscaping that
can act as a barrier, but not impede vision (it is recommended that wall and hedge heights
not exceed 2.5 feet (Post, 1995)). There are many types of barriers available. Natural
barriers can include landscaping elements such as rocks, trees, low walls or planters,
terraced landscaping (Figure 2.10 illustrates a terraced courtyard in front of an office




Figure 2.10: Terraced Office Courtyard.
Source: Popular Science. 1996.
It is important to note that barriers should be effective physically. For example,
as illustrated in Figure 2. 1 1, a chain link fence may be an effective psychological barrier,
but it may not be as effective physically as other fence types or barriers.
21

Figure 2.11: Effective Barriers: chain link fence (left) can be easily cut or climbed. Iron
or steel fencing (right) is sturdier and has no crosspieces for climbing.
Source: ENR, 1995.
Other examples of natural access control include:
Considering all vehicular approaches, in other words, just because the road doesn't go
to the building doesn't mean the car can't get there.
Creating specific "zones" of activity - such as keeping visitors parking separate from
employee parking.
Including traffic calming strategies such as curving roads, adding central medians,
adding road humps and speed bumps, and making the roads narrower. Other methods
to reduce traffic speed include, planting trees close to the edge ofthe road to make the
road feel narrower, and putting stripes on the road at decreasing intervals to make
drivers feel like they are going faster. Figure 2. 12 illustrates the use ofparking as a
traffic calming strategy. This strategy also encourages pedestrians to use the
sidewalk, which increases natural surveillance and territoriality.
22

Figure 2.12: Traffic Calming: angled parking (right) is one device that can be used for
traffic calming.
Source: ENR, 1995
4. Activity Placement - is the logical placement ofuser activities to encourage the
above principles. Crime prevention should flow naturally and routinely from the activity
being promoted in a space. CPTED involves the design ofphysical space in the context
ofthe needs ofthe space's users, the designated normal use ofthe space, and the
predicted behavior ofboth users and offenders (Crowe, 1991). Design approaches
include:
Recognizing the designated use of a space.
- Defining the problems and compatible solutions.
Incorporating strategies that enhance (or do not impair) the effective use ofthe space.
Crowe uses the "Three-D" approach, which is based on three functions or
dimensions ofhuman space, as a guide to determine the appropriateness ofhow space is
designed and used:
"All human space has some designated purpose.
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- All human space has some social, cultural, legal or physical definitions that proscribe
the desired and acceptable behaviors.
- All human space is designated to support and control the desired behaviors." (Crowe,
1991, pg. 33).
By using these concepts as a guide, "space may be evaluated by asking the
following types of questions:
Designation:
- What is the designated purpose ofthis space?
- What was it originally intended to be used for?
- How well does the space support its current use?
- Is there conflict?
Definition:
- How is the space defined?
- Is it clear who owns it?
- Where are its borders?
- Are there social or cultural definitions that affect how the space is used?
- Are the legal or administrative rules clearly set out and reinforced in policy?
- Are there signs?
- Is there conflict or confusion between the designated purpose and definition?
Design:
- How well does the physical design support the intended function?
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How well does the physical design support the definition ofthe desired or accepted
behaviors?
Does the physical design conflict with or impede the productive use ofthe space or
the proper functioning ofthe intended human activity?
Is there confusion or conflict in the manner in which the physical design is intended
to control behavior?" (Crowe, 1991, pg. 33-34)
By using the 'Three D" approach, activity placement can be designed to promote
improved natural surveillance, access control, and territoriality. A specific strategy to
achieve this might include designing the site so that the normal activities ofpersonnel are
located in areas that will allow them to observe and take ownership ofthe space.
Possible outdoor activities include athletics, eating, and smoking.
5. Maintenance - encourages upkeep and continual re-evaluation of systems. This
principle is also concerned with the image and milieu ofthe area. (Newman, 1972). The
appearance of a place reflects the attention and care that is given to the space (Wilson &
Kelling, 1982). Maintenance can influence the perception of an area's importance to the
people responsible for it. If an area is perceived as important, it will appear to be more
secure and there will be a sense that there is a greater likelihood ofbeing observed and
questioned. Examples of maintenance practices that influence image and milieu include




The best design approach is to incorporate a combination of all ofthe above
principles. For example, you can have excellent natural surveillance, but potential
offenders must perceive that unauthorized intrusion will evoke protective territorial
behavior responses from the users. Ifpeople observe inappropriate behavior but do




TERRORISM AND RECENT TERRORIST EVENTS
Overview
The section ofthe report will examineforce protection, and terrorism. It will look
at why these terrorism andforce protection issues are a concernfor the Department of
Defense (DOD). A description ofthe effects ofbomb blasts on buildings will be given.
This section will also examine thefollowing recent acts ofterrorism and discuss them in
relationship to the use ofCPTED concepts:
• U.S. Marine barracks, Beirut, Lebanon
• Khobar Towers, Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia
• Federal Building, Oklahoma City
• U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dor es Salaam.
A projection will be made on how the use ofthe CPTED techniques could have increased
the security ofthefacilities.
Force Protection
In order to do a comprehensive design or plan for a facility, it is important to have
a thorough understanding ofwhy the design is being done, and what it is meant to
accomplish. Therefore, when doing an antiterrorism design it is important to understand
what terrorism is and the concepts connected with it. The basic terms and concepts
associated with terrorism are being reviewed in order to promote this understanding.
When considering terrorism in context with the military, many people associate the
term "force protection" with antiterrorism However, force protection is actually a
general Department ofDefense (DOD) term that refers to measures designed to deter any
type ofthreat to military service members, their families, DOD civilians, and the facilities
and equipment which support them in the execution of responsibilities. These measures
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include ways to mitigate against not only terrorists, but any threat that affects the ability
of a person or facility to carry out their mission, including natural disasters and more
common crimes such as theft. For the purpose ofthis report the term "force protection"
will be used to indicate antiterrorism. "Antiterrorism" indicates a defensive stance, as
compared to the term "counterterrorism", which is associated with offensive measures
(DOD 0-2000. 12-H).
POD Priority
Force protection is a priority for DOD since defense personnel are the largest
single contingent of U.S. Government representatives abroad. Because they are symbols
ofthe U.S. Government, DOD personnel have been targets ofterrorist attacks for many
years. Between 1971 and 1992 there were over 140 separate terrorist incidents against
DOD-affiliated personnel and installation, resulting in nearly 300 dead and more than
200 injured (DOD 0-2000. 12-H). The recent attacks on U.S. soil have increased concern
that U.S. military installations within the United States could also be targeted.
Increasingly high-ranking military officials have listed force protection as a top priority.
Quotes such as the following from Secretary ofDefense William J. Perry illustrate both
the concern and the commitment of officials for force protection measures:
*'.
. . Force protection measures, such as moving the location of our forces
and building barriers, cannot eliminate the risk to our forces - but they can
minimize those risks. Indeed, force protection is a key part of every
military mission - it is my top priority whenever I approve a military
operation or a training exercise." Secretary ofDefense William J. Perry,




There is a broad range of definitions ofterrorism, many ofwhich contain different
elements. Most definitions ofterrorism include the calculated or premeditated use of
violence to achieve a goal (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 1990). Definitions ofterrorism
differ, even within the U.S. Government.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines it as ". . . the unlawful use of force
or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance ofpolitical or social
objectives."
- The U.S. Department of State (DOS) defines terrorism as ". . . premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an
audience."
- The Department ofDefense (DOD) defines terrorism as 'The calculated use of
violence or threat ofviolence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or try to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit ofgoals that are generally political, religious,
or ideological." (DOD 0-2000. 12-H).
Botz, Dudonis, and Schulz, in The Counter-Terrorism Handbook (1990). identify
the following universal elements or commonalties ofterrorist activities:
1
)
The use ofviolence to persuade
2) Selection oftargets and victims for maximum propaganda value
3) The use ofunprovoked attacks
4) Maximum publicity at minimum risk
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5) The use of surprise to circumvent countermeasures
6) Threats, harassment, and violence is used to create an atmosphere of fear.
7) Disregard for or ofwomen and children as victims
8) Propaganda is used to maximize the effect ofviolence
9) Loyalty only to themselves or kindred groups
It is important to understand common elements ofterrorism and why particular
targets are selected, both in order to come up with strategies to effectively combat
terrorism, and to understand why particular strategies should work.
Identifying targets
Most terrorists see any target as fair game. In some cases the more important or
revered a potential target, the better it is in a terrorists' eyes because it will create a more
significant reaction from the public (Livingstone, 1982). The selection of a target by a
terrorist is often a product of careful consideration. Three factors typically form the basis
for a terrorist's decision on what target to select. The first factor is the type ofweapons
available to the terrorist. The second factor is opportunity, or the vulnerability ofthe
target. And the third is the goal or effect the terrorist hopes to achieve through his action.
(Livingstone, 1982).
The goal of a terrorist attack may be symbolic, it can represent allegiance, or
punishment, or it may be a part of a military type objective. Or it can also be a
combination of all ofthe above. A majority oftargets are symbolic: they are selected
both for what they represent and in order to convey a specific message to a specific
audience. Some experts say that much ofthe effectiveness ofterrorism is due to its
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symbolic nature. It is possible that both the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut and
the attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia were symbolic acts against U.S. - as
represented by the military personnel who lived in those complexes. A great deal of
targeting is based on the terrorist's allegiance to a group or community. Targets are
selected because they represent "the other side" in a conflict that the terrorist or his
organization is involved in (Livingstone, 1982).
Targeting can also be based on the concept ofpunishment. Ifthe terrorist
believes he or his organization has been victimized, the terrorist may chose a target in
order to cause harm to the opponent. (Livingstone, 1982). One ofthe theories regarding
the reason behind the attack on the Federal building in Oklahoma City by militia
sympathizers was that it represented, in part, a retaliation against the government seizure
ofthe militia compound in Waco, Texas. A target may also be chosen because it has
objective military importance. Military type targets are chosen because their elimination
will undermine the efficiency of an enemy's operation. (Livingstone, 1982).
Tactics
There are several types oftactics terrorist employ to carry out their objective of




2. Assassinations and assaults
3. Kidnapping
4. Hostage-taking/skyjacking/barricade situations (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 1990).
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According to Botz, Dudonis and Schulz, bombings are the most frequent type of
terrorist tactic, accounting for approximately 80% ofterrorist-related violence. Reasons
why terrorists prefer bombings to other types ofviolence include the following:
1. Bombing gains media attention, particularly ifthe target is highly visible or symbolic.
2. Bombing is a cheap and efficient way to attack a facility.
3. Bombing can be accomplished with a small number ofpersonnel.
4. There is minimal risk ofthe bombers being detected or apprehended.
5. Bombing is inexpensive in comparison with alternatives such as kidnapping or
hostage taking.
6. Random bombings make considerable impact on the population, since more people
fear a bomb attack than fear being kidnapped or taken hostage.
7. Explosives are readily available through theft, sympathetic support, or purchase
(Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 1990).
Due to the prevalence ofbombings as a means for terrorists to inflict violence,
facility protection efforts usually involve concentrating on the protection of structures
and personnel from the effects ofbomb blasts as the primary tactic to increase force
protection. The act of increasing physical protection is, in and of itself, a potentially
effective strategy for force protection. "In mounting a bombing campaign . . . terrorists
undertake a great deal ofreconnaissance and normally select whichever target looks most
vulnerable . . . They select the easiest target . . . Like water, terrorists flow along the path




The views of experts on the potential for effective antiterrorism strategies are
positive:
"Since the intention ofthe terrorist is to instill fear into the population at
large, there is a common motivation to the criminal acts they perpetrate.
Because there is a common element to terrorism, counterterrorism has a
foundation on which to base defensive strategies and tactics. Anything
that can be done to reduce fear and anxiety among the general population
is an effective defense against terrorism" (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz,
1990, pg. 1).
terrorist groups are independent in that they follow their individual
convictions, yet united in the intentional destruction of established order.
Terrorists are, in a word, predictable. Their actions create victims beyond
the range oftheir intended targets. Yet they are also human and fallible,
which affords society and opportunity to protect itself' (Bolz, Dudonis,
and Schulz, 1990, pg. xiii).
As mentioned above, understanding some ofthe basic elements ofterrorism can be useful
in developing antiterrorism strategies.
Terrorism differs from other crimes in several respects. The probability of an
attack from terrorists is small as compared to the frequency of other crimes. However,
there is a much greater potential for loss of life and property (Atlas, 1995). Also, given
terrorists' tendencies to be mdiscriminant in their choice oftargets and to disregard
wholesale destruction, the emotional aftereffects can be felt by a great number ofpeople.
The Effects of Bomb Blasts
As mentioned above, bombings are the most common type ofterrorist tactics used
and are usually the type of attack which facilities concentrate their force protection
efforts on. When designing protection against car bombs it is helpful to have a basic
understanding ofthe type of damage a bomb does and how it effects structures within its
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immediate proximity. Casualties from a bomb blast can be the result of direct blast
effects such as blast pressure, building collapse, debris impact, fire, smoke, or a variety of
other causes. The extent ofthe damage to a structure depends on the building design, the
type ofexplosive used, and the location ofthe explosive relative to the building (National
Research Council, 1995).
Building design is related to architectural hardening, or actual architectural
elements and building techniques used to make a building more difficult to destroy.
Architectural hardening can be very expensive, whether the building is existing or in the
design stage (National Research Council, 1995, Nadis, 1996). While it may be
recommended for some buildings (depending on the level ofthreat and the vulnerability
ofthe structure) this paper is concentrating on a planning and site design approach to
antiterrorism, and so will not discuss physical hardening ofbuildings.
The type and size of an explosive will determine its destructive potential.
Explosive materials release a large amount ofenergy in a short amount oftime. Ifthe
speed ofthe reaction is faster than the speed ofthe explosive's sound, than the bomb is
considered to be a "high explosive". "High explosives produce a shock wave along with
gas . . . The effect of (these) explosives on structures are directly related to the stress-wave
propagation as well as impact and missile penetration" (National Research Council, 1995,
pg. 28-29.) Ifthe blast occurs inside a structure, the effects are multiplied due to the
pressure being reflected. Ifthe blast occurs at a sufficient distance from the structure, all
ofthe building elements will provide some degree of resistance, although they may
deform to some extent. It the blast occurs close to a wall or floor, some degree of
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disintegration may occur, causing fragments to come off and be propelled as missiles
(National Research Council, 1995).
The force of an explosion falls off drastically over distance (Jehl, 1996, Nadis,
1996). The further away the bomb is located, the more rapidly the pressure decreases.
Figure 3. 1 uses the front elevation ofthe Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to
illustrates the decrease in pressure (in pounds per square inch) as the distance from the
point of detonation increases.
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Figure 3.1: Peak Overpressures on North Elevation ofMurrah Federal Building.
Source: Journal ofPerformance of Constructed Facilities, August 1998, pg. 115.
Most experts agree that distance is the most effective means of minimizing the
effects ofbomb blasts (National Research Council, 1995, Jehl, 1996). CPTED's use of
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space as a form of access control is one ofthe reasons it can be an effective deterrent
against terrorist attacks.
Recent Terrorist Events
There have been several attacks on military and federal facilities in the recent
years. These attacks both indicate possible patterns for future terrorist attacks, and they
illustrate the need for increased facility planning and security. Reviews of several
significant attacks follow. In these reviews, projections are made as to how CPTED
techniques could have been applied to increase the targets' security.
U.S. Marine barracks, Beirut, Lebanon
The attack on the U.S. Marine headquarters and barracks building in Beirut,
Lebanon on October 23, 1983, was perhaps one ofthe most significant in terms ofraising
the awareness ofthe need for protection for military facilities. The attack resulted in 241
men being killed, the largest number of military personnel killed in a single attack since
Pearl Harbor (Beck, 1983; Thomas, 1984). The Marines were in Lebanon as a high-
profile, peace-keeping force working with the Lebanese to keep the Beirut airport open to
commercial flights (Banta, 1983).
The attack was perpetrated by a suicide bomber who rammed his way into the
Marine compound and into the lobby ofthe building containing the barracks with a truck
containing an estimated 12,000 pounds of explosives. The truck, a type commonly used
around the airport, approached the facility from the direction of Beirut, driving south
along the main highway to the airport around 6:20 am It passed an unmanned Lebanese
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perimeter guard post and turned into the airport parking lot. There, within view of a
Marine guard, it circled the parking lot twice then turned north, gathering speed. It then
crashed through a row of concertina wire, past two marine sentry guards, whose M-16s
(guns) were unloaded, and through an open rear gate into the compound and the building,
as illustrated in Figure 3.2 (Beck, 1989; Thomas, 1984). Note that a more recent article
indicates that the wire mesh fence shown running across the parking lot in Figure 3.2 may
not have existed (Thomas, 1984).
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TRAIL OF A KAMIKAZE
"
Figure 3.2: Route ofterrorist through the Marine compound.
Beirut, Lebanon, October 1983.
Source: Newsweek. Nov. 7, 1983, pg. 87.
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The layout and use ofthe compound defied almost all ofthe CPTED principles:
Territoriality
The congressional subcommittee's report on the incident indicated that an hour
and 20 minutes before the attack, a truck, possibly the one used in the bombing, circled
with its lights off in the parking lot outside the Marine headquarters. A car entered the
parking lot about five minutes before the attack, and its driver began taking pictures of
the building. The report indicated that the guard thought this was "kind of strange" but
that the Marines did not try to load their rifles until the truck was speeding past them on
its final approach (Thomas, 1984).
That these abnormal behaviors did not inspire the guards to do more than they did
would seem to indicate a lack ofterritoriality or personal ownership on their part.
Perhaps they did not feel a sense of responsibility or concern because these events were
happening "on the other side ofthe line" from what they saw as the boundary oftheir
compound. The parking lot appears to have been a general use lot for the airport. If it
had been assigned specifically to the Marine headquarters, perhaps the sense of
territoriality might have been heightened.
Surveillance
The compound relied on an organizational approach to surveillance in that they
had sentries placed around the compound. However, the Lebanese checkpoint, which
may have been able to provide advanced warning about an attack, was unmanned (Beck,
1983). As indicated above, not only were the guards on duty unable to respond quickly
39

enough to provide adequate notice to the occupants ofthe buildings, they also did not
pick up on previous activity that indicated they might be in danger.
As was mentioned previously in this report, even if surveillance is excellent,
potential offenders must also perceive that unauthorized intrusion will evoke protective
territorial behavior responses from the users. As noted previously, ifpersonnel observe
inappropriate behavior but do nothing about it, surveillance will not work (Crowe, 1991).
In this case the weakness seems to be more of a territoriality issue than a lack of actual
surveillance.
Access Control
The compound used both organizational and "semi-natural" forms of access
control. They used a system of barriers around the compound but the barriers were
ineffective for the type of attack they faced. The truck had a relatively straight line of
approach from the parking lot to the building, though it is estimated that it was only
going 30 M.P.H. when it passed the Marine's posts. Although there were also an iron
gate and iron pipes between the parking lot and the building, the only operating barrier
was the roll of concertina wire. According to one ofthe guards it '"just made a popping
sound" as the truck drove through, "like someone walking over twigs"" (Thomas, 1984,
pg. 56). Figure 3.3 illustrates some ofthe problems with the barrier effectiveness.
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Figure 3.3: Marine Barracks, Beirut - Lack of barrier effectiveness.
Source: Time. January 2, 1984, pg. 56.
That more effective methods of access control could have been used in this case
seems relatively obvious. Traffic calming devices such as speed bumps or curving the
roads may have slowed the truck down even more, but the most effective form of access
control would probably have been a series ofbarriers that would have denied the truck
access to the actual building. Ifdone in an aesthetic manner, these barriers may have
even increased the sense ofterritoriality for the Marines.
Activity Placement
There does not appear to have been any attempt to use activity placement to
improve natural surveillance, access control or territoriality. In fact, one article noted the




General appearance and maintenance was not described in the articles about this
incident. However, the gate in front ofthe compound was left open during a time when
the Marines had been inundated with intelligence reports warnings against terrorist
attacks, (Thomas, 1984) indicating a lack of attention to even the few barriers that were
in place.
Khobar Towers, Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia
The most recent large-scale attack against a military facility occurred on June 25,
1996, with the bombing ofKhobar Towers, and Air Force housing complex in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. The attack claimed the lives of 19 service members and injured 300. The
personnel were part of a force of approximately 5,000 military personnel who were in
Saudi Arabia to enforce the authority ofthe Saudi royal house and ultimately, to protect
U.S. oil interests (Dickey, 1996).
The blast was caused by a fuel truck packed with 3,000 - 5,000 pounds ofhigh
explosives that was thought to be parked beside the compound fence by Muslim
extremists. Even though the truck was parked outside ofthe complex, it was less than
100 feet from Building 131, one ofthe housing complexes. Although several buildings
were damaged, 18 ofthe 19 people who died were in Building 131 (Jehl, 1996). Figure
3.4 illustrates the layout ofthe compound and describes the sequence of events.
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A Bomb—And 3 Minutes' Warning
The men of the 4404th Air Wing had long feared that Khobar Towers Building 131,
home to many of its men, was too near the road, too open to attack. Last Tuesday their
fears were realized when a truck carrying a massive bomb exploded outside the build-
ing, leaving 19 dead, 300 wounded and a 35-fbot-deep crater.
A Scramble—Then Horror and Heroism
O At about 9:45 pan., a large
tanker trade and an accompa-
nying white car drive into the
parking lot of a nearby park in
a clockwise direction- Tbe lot,
which is unguarded and open
to anyone, abuts the Khobar
Ibwers complex, where
American, British and French
troops are housed
Windows wtthla a half
Three US- Air Force offi-
cers, manning a guard post
only recently created atop
Khobar Building 131, are the
first to notice something
peculiar as the truck and car
roll onto 31st Street, running








Shortly after 9:45 p.m..
one of the officers, Sgt. Alfre-
do Guerrero, radios the
base's security force about a
likely terrorist attack when
the truck backs closer to the
hedge and its driverJumps
into the accompanying car,
which speeds away from the
truck and out ofthe lot
Thai
aarvt as a nuncn i
i troops.
ThaHngaJxMAzbAIr
Base Js part of the
i km
Guerrero and the other
guards scramble into the
building, and go door to door,
warning residents. Fire
alarms cannot be used be-
cause they could lead soldiers
out of the building and toward
the bomb. The top two floors
of the building have been
alerted when the bomb goes
off about three minutes later.
tuaitMinicann.iuaiU'
naniiiunaouinuuonc
Figure 3.4: Layout and events ofKhobar Towers bombing.
Source: Newsweek, July 8, 1996, pg. 24.
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The Air Force was under a high threat ofterrorism and both had and were still
attempting to harden the complex at the time ofthe attack (Kitfield, 1997). Sentries had
been placed on the roofs of several buildings. Concrete barriers had been placed around
the perimeter ofthe facility, and a second set ofbarriers was planned. A security
assessment had been done and included a recommendation to put protective plastic film
on the compound's windows to prevent a blast from turning them into lethal shards of
flying glass. There were several difficulties with hardening this particular building, the
main one ofwhich was the lack of standoff distance. This had been identified as a
problem and the local Saudi military commanders had been approached with a request to
extend the northern edge ofthe facility boundary to 400 feet, but had balked in granting
it, and so the issue had not been pursued further (Jehl, 1996).
Territoriality and Surveillance
Increasing territoriality and surveillance would probably not have been a great
deal ofhelp in this case. Both Saudi and American security personnel noticed the
vehicle. A Saudi police officer called for a tow-truct An American sentry on the
rooftop saw the driver and his accomplices flee the truck and sounded the alarm. An Air
Force security policeman dialed the number to activate a loud speaker warning system,
but the bomb went offbefore a general warning could be issued (Jehl, 1996).
Access control
Officials said the major focus ofthe security precautions in Dhahran had been to
prevent a truck or car from penetrating the compound itself. This may go back to the
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principle ofterritoriality and the tendency to think that one's responsibility stops at the
fence line. The presence ofthe sentries and the concern over the lack of stand-off
distance argue against this. In any case, access control to the compound was a priority
and barriers had been erected to keep unwanted personnel out. One ofthe problems was
that the threat assessment was only based on a 200 pound explosive. The bomb that
destroyed Khobar towers was the largest ofHs kind that the Saudis had encountered (Jehl,
1996).
Activity Placement
The main CPTED principle that applies to this case is activity placement. Given
the threat assessment and the vulnerability ofthe structure, the housing of military
personnel was probably not an appropriate activity for Building 131. Apparently there
were other residential spaces in more secure buildings on the Khobar facility where the
occupants ofBuilding 131 could have been moved, but that option had not been
considered (Jehl, 1996).
Federal Building, Oklahoma City
The deadliest terrorist attack in the United States occurred on April 19, 1995, with
the bombing ofthe Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (ENR, 1995).
The blast occurred when a truck containing approximately 4,000 pounds ofhigh
explosives parked on the street in front ofthe building about 10-15 feet from the north
facade and about 40-50 feet from the east building end. The blast destroyed several
structural columns, causing the upper floors ofthe nine story building to collapse,
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resulting in 168 deaths, and numerous injuries. The blast also caused an estimated $50
million in damages to the approximately 75 buildings in the area (National Research
Council, 1995). Figure 3.5 shows the damages to the Federal building and several other
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Figure 3.5: Damage to Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and surrounding structures.
Source: Newsweek, May 1, 1995, pp. 44-45.
Although the Federal Building is not a military facility, it is significant because
the terrorist act occurred in the United States. The main weakness ofthis she was its lack
of set back from the street on the building's North side. As the plan ofthe site (Figure
3.6) indicates, the other sides ofthe building appear more protected.
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Figure 3.6: Site Plan for Murrah Building.
Source: Journal ofPerformance of Constructed Facilities, August 1998, p. 121.
Territoriality and Surveillance
Although it is speculation, it can be conjectured that the interior layout ofthe
building did not allow for much natural surveillance. The first floor was partially set
back from the street, and the columns in front may have created blind spots from the
inside. This lack of surveillance, along with its location next to a public street and
sidewalk, almost certainly did not lend itself to encouraging a sense of territoriality in the
building's occupants. That the driver ofthe truck had time to get away after he had left
the truck indicates it was on the street for several minutes before the bomb went off It is




The lack of a set back from the street allowed easy car and truck access to the
front ofthe building.
Activity Placement
The interior layout ofbuilding's office space was not available, but a reception
desk or offices facing out onto the street may have improved visibility. Territoriality
would have been more difficult to achieve given the public nature ofthe street and
sidewalk immediately adjacent to the building.
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Par es Salaam.
One ofthe most recent attacks on U.S. facilities occurred on August 7,1998.
There were actually two attacks, occurring almost simultaneously at the U.S. Embassies
in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The blasts killed 247 people in Nairobi,
including 12 Americans, and 10 people in Tanzania. Over 4,000 people were injured
(The Gainesville Sun, Aug 12, 1998). Neither one ofthe buildings met the current State
Department security standards and set-back requirements. The embassies had received
waivers because terrorism was not considered a serious threat to U.S. embassies in Africa
(Greve, 1998).
Nairobi Kenya
The Nairobi Embassy was located at an intersection and faces Moi Avenue, a
busy public street. It has no security fence in front, but was surrounded by an 8-foot-high
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steel fence on the other three sides. The bomb was apparently located in the parking lot
behind the embassy or in an alley between the embassy and another building. The blast
gutted the rear halfofthe U.S. Embassy and leveled a three-story building containing a
secretarial school next door. GS Aug. 9. An illustration ofthe embassy site is shown in
Figure 3.7.
Par es Salaam. Tanzania
The embassy in Tanzania, a former private mansion, was set back from the street.
There was also a 9-foot masonry wall around the perimeter ofthe compound with
guardhouses at two entrances (Cooperman, 1998). The bomb, which was reportedly
planted in a gasoline taker, went offnear the entrance ofthe embassy building. The front
ofthe building was destroyed and a side wall and trees were toppled (McKinley, 1998).
A partial illustration ofthe embassy is shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Embassy sites in Africa.




It is difficult to speculate as to the territoriality ofthe people in the embassies.
Not enough ofthe facts are available to give a clear picture ofwhat happened.
Surveillance and Access control
Organizational and mechanical surveillance and access control was used at both
embassies, including cameras, metal detectors, and Marines guards (Grave, 1998). There
were cameras at the embassy in Kenya that were pointed towards the back parking lot,
unfortunately they were for monitoring only and did not record the bombing (GS, Aug.
12). However, observers did claim to see men running from the parking lot firing
machine guns. And although there was a nine foot fence around the Tanzanian embassy
compound, the car containing the explosive was parked inside, meaning that it had
somehow passed by the security guards (Cooperman, 1998).
Conclusion
As noted, many ofthe more recent bombing attacks have been against facilities
that were close to public streets. Although it may be nearly impossible to improve access
control in existing buildings that can not be set back from a public roadway, other
CPTED principles can increase security to some extent. Natural surveillance can be
improved through activity placement and interior office layout, which may also increase
territoriality. Surveillance can also be improved through mechanical, electrical and
organizational means. One thing to remember about organizational access control or
surveillance is that humans are fallible and they can make mistakes. They are much more
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likely to question abnormal behavior ifthey feel a sense of ownership towards the area
they are charged with protecting.
On most military bases, roads and parking can and should be moved or rerouted,
especially ifthe threat warrants it. In the case of military facilities, the most difficult
structures to protect will probably be the ones that are near to the perimeter ofthe facility.
In this case, it is critical to review what activities are taking place in the building and




CPTED GUIDELINES FOR FORCE PROTECTION
Overview
Based on the comprehensive planningprocess, a general set ofguidelines will be
developed that can be used by planners andfacilitypersonnel to develop plansfor their
facilities. A step by step description ofthis process will be included in this chapter. By
using this process, a comprehensive plan can be developed that will increaseforce
protection through the use ofthefive CPTED principles.
Guidelines for Using CPTED and Planning in Force Protection
This section will put in place a general set ofguidelines that can be used by
planners and facility personnel to increase force protection through the use ofCPTED.
One ofthe weaknesses ofthe Navy antiterrorism and security policy, which will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 6, is the lack ofemphasis on comprehensive base planning.
When doing an antiterrorism plan for a facility is important to consider the base in its
entirety and also the surrounding community, especially adjacent land uses. In keeping
with the concept of comprehensive planning, the guide for antiterrorism design should be
based on the comprehensive planning model that follows:












Comprehensive planning, also referred to as master, general, or development
planning, is "planning for the totality rather than for one or several of its constituent
parts" (Branch, 1998, pg. 3). Models for comprehensive planning usually contain the
above steps. The model is basically a rational, decision making process (Alexander,
1986). The whole process should undergo continual reevaluation, as indicated by the
arrows in the model above.










Problem identification is the basic process of identifying a problem and the goals
and objectives for solving the problem. In antiterrorism design, this step would consist of
the basic threat assessmentphase identified in the DOD handbook, in other words,
pinpointing possible targets on a facility and assessing the likelihood that they will be
attacked. This step will help determine how much effort and how many resources should
be committed to the force protection effort, and where these resources should be
concentrated.
The NAVFAC Security Engineering Course identifies the following types of









Although this list is a good starting place for target identification, it is important
to remember that it is not all-inclusive. A specific mission or even location of an activity
or facility that is not listed may increase the potential of its being a target. It is also
possible that a place can be a target by virtue ofthe surrounding land uses. N1SCOM is
one resource that can assist a Navy facility in making threat assessment determinations.
NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Service
Center may also have this capability.










The data-gathering phase is one ofthe most important steps in the planning
process. All decisions should be based on data. Therefore, the better and more
comprehensive the data available, the better informed the decision can be.
Crowe identifies five basic types of information that need to be collected and used
when designing physical space:




- Land use information (pedestrian and traffic flows and boundaries)
- Observations
- Resident or user interviews (Crowe, 1991).
Crime analysis information
This is data that can be used to determine and describe possible threats. Possible
crime analysis data includes:
- The type and strength ofbomb that will most likely be used (should be available from
NAVFAC orNISCOM)
Crime rate and types of crime in the surrounding community (available at local police
department). Two patterns to look for in crime data are geographic location of crimes
and similar types of offenses (Crowe, 1991).
Demographic information
Demographic information describes the nature ofthe population in an area. It can
be useful for activity placement and strategies to improve territoriality. For a military
facility it can include:
- job types
- breakdowns of rate and rank (may be available at Personnel Support Departments
(PSDs) or from individual activities. City managers or planning departments should




Land use information indicates the physical layouts and uses of land. It may be
useful to depict this type of information graphically, in map format. It can show natural
boundaries and other important geographical features of a base. It includes:
Specific locations ofroads and buildings
- Pedestrian and traffic flows and boundaries
- Location of different activities on and around a facility (available at Navy Publics
Works Department and local planning and publics works departments.)
Observations
Conducting formal or informal visual reviews ofa physical area is the best way to
get first-hand knowledge ofwho uses an area, different ways in which the area is used,
and when those uses take place (Crowe, 1991). This can be very useful in developing
strategies for natural surveillance, territoriality and activity placement. Useful
observations may include:
- pedestrian or vehicle counts
maintenance levels
- the degree ofproprietary behavior exhibited by users
- patterns of activity on the site
Resident or user interviews
Interviews can provide information that fills in or balances the other data sources
(Crowe, 1991). How people identify with their surroundings and their perceptions about
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how the physical environment affects them can be very useful. Perceptions can help
identify unsafe areas, areas that tend to be avoided, and other physical weaknesses of a
facility that the project team would not necessarily observe during infrequent visits. How
personnel use or would like to use their space can help determine effective activity
placement.
It might be useful to consider interviewing residents outside the installation gates,
in adjacent areas/communities as well as personnel who work in the actual facility. One
fundamental question here would be their sense of connection with the base such that
they might recognize and report "abnormal users" to base authorities before they were on
base.








Analyzing data is using the information that has been gathered to identify
strengths and weaknesses of a plan, facility, area, or even ofthe data and resources
themselves. An example ofthis is the use ofbomb blast information to identify standoff
distance. The identification of standoff distances is usually the basis or starting point of
an antiterrorism design, so it is a critical piece of information. The NAVFAC Security
Engineering Course uses a 1000-pound explosive as a standard for determining standoff
distance. The DoD instruction recommends a 100-foot minimum setback from the
perimeter ofthe facility. NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions, and the Naval Facilities
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Engineering Service Center are resources that can calculate bomb blast radiuses and help
determine appropriate standoff distances and thus help base/facilities planners analyze the
vulnerabilities oftheir plans and designs.









After the data is analyzed, design options are developed based on the analysis and
on the stated goals and objectives ofthe project. Developing options is a design process.
It is circular to the extent that it has several phases, all which follow a modified form of
the comprehensive planning model Developing options involves a series ofnegotiations
with a number of concerned parties. To develop design options based on CPTED
techniques, the five basic CPTED concepts should be considered in relationship to the
data that was collected.
The design process usually begins with several preliminary ideas or options that
are developed from project team "brain storming" sessions. After the brain storming, the
ideas are consolidated into several options based on overall strategies. These options are
presented either formally or informally. They usually include graphic representations of
the ideas being presented. Formal presentations may be made in front of major players
and decision-makers and often include a large number of interested parties. Informal
presentations may be presentations made in front ofthe actual project team, or may be in
the form ofpackets of information that are distributed and reviewed by the interested
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parties on an individual basis. This step may also include a combination of both formal
and informal presentations, depending on how complex the problem is.
The project team may include a number of concerned parties including; planners,
security personnel, facility personnel, the customers or the people working or Irving in
the buildings that are being considered targets for the purpose ofhardening, and people
from the surrounding community. Even if one ofthese groups is not on the actual project
team, they may have ideas or concerns that have not previously been addressed and
therefore might be valuable additions to review sessions or presentations. All ofthe
above groups would be important as interviewees in the data gathering phase in order to
gather the appropriate information to do the project.
Each ofthese players can contribute certain valuable ideas and information to the
design process. For example: in deciding activity placement, the activity user is critical
in determining ifthe plan will work with the daily activities and routines that occur in his
or her space. They will be able to gauge ifthe particular elements ofthe plan are
practical or not. Working with the project may also help them formulate ideas about the
arrangement of activities that the other team members were not able to pick up on in
interviews or observations ofthe site.
The planner can provide a "big picture" view ofthe base as well as projections for
future use that will help in developing a comprehensive plan. The planner can also
provide a background in physical design that other players may not possess. Either the
planners or the facility personnel may also have a background in engineering, which
would allow them to have a clearer understanding ofthe actual effects of a bomb blast on
a building. Facility personnel are in charge ofthe physical functioning and upkeep ofthe
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base. They are also the ones who will probably have to request the funding for any
physical changes to the base, so it is critical that they understand the process and why the
changes are being requested.
The security officer is the person who is actually designated the responsibility for
force protection. He can be critical in getting the process started and in helping to assess
the actual needs ofthe facility. The security officer can provide a background in the
elements and theories ofhow physical security works. He will be more familiar with the
strengths and weaknesses ofthe base and security force than other participants, including
reasonable force response times, threat types and levels, and other important data.
The local citizens can be useful in developing an interface between the base and
the community. They can help gage the effectiveness of zones and perimeters. They can
also identify threats outside ofthe limits ofthe facility that the base personnel may not be
aware of. Ifthey know that a threat exists, they may be able to help identify it before it
reaches the facility. This can be particularly important ifthere is a vulnerable building or
activity close to the periphery ofthe base. Open communications with the community













Once design options are developed, the options should be evaluated in order to
identify any problems or conflicts, such as fire and safety access to buildings, etc. As
indicated by the arrows in the model, the planning process should be repeated to solve
identified problems. Once the problems are worked out, the most reasonable options
should be selected.
After the preliminary ideas have been critiqued, intermediate designs should be
developed and presented following the same process. Ifthe problem is not complex, the
intermediate phase can be skipped. Decision making personnel should be present at the
final design presentation, whether it is preliminary or intermediate. It is important for the
implementation phase ofthe project to have the people in charge understand what is
being proposed and the reasons behind the proposals. While the intermediate design can
be reviewed formally or informally, a formal presentation is recommended. Hearing the
ideas of one person spoken vocally tends to inspire more ideas in the listeners, which can
result in useful discussion and informal (on the spot) problem solving. A separate
informal review after the presentation may also be useful.
The final design is developed based on the feedback from the presentations and
reviews. Again, this design should also go through a review, but it can be informal. The
purpose of a final review is to simply take one last look at the final design to make sure
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all ofthe recommendations have been included and work together in a logical,
comprehensive manner.










The implementation phase involves the process ofputting the selected option or
options in place. It is important to already have decision-making personnel on board with
the project in order to successfully carry out this phase. Implementation requires
resources and the power to use them. The distribution ofresources can be very political.
If decision making personnel, such as the Commanding Officer ofthe base, are
enthusiastic about the project and support it, obtaining resources to implement the project
is much easier.








Once the selected options have been implemented they should be reevaluated on a
regular basis to determine ifthey remain effective. Evaluation should follow the
planning process, as indicated by the arrows in the modeL A formal time schedule is
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recommended to determine who will review the plan, when the plan will be reviewed,
and what the reviewers will look for. The base master plan is already scheduled to be
reviewed by the planning department on a regular basis. Incorporating the antiterrorism
plan into the base master plan could help expedite the evaluation process. But it is
important to make sure all ofthe critical players, including the security personnel and the




ADAPTING CPTED TO FORCE PROTECTION -
JIAF-EAST CASE STUDY
Overview
The JJATF-EASTproject was undertaken by a multidisciplinary teamfrom the
University ofFlorida (UF) at the request of thefacility 's Physical Security Officer, Mr.
Alan Mather. Mr. Mather also acted as the client representative and the project liaison.
The project provides a good illustration ofthe steps in the comprehensive planning model
and will be used to assist in explaining the process ofincorporating CPTED intoforce
protection.
Process
Although the comprehensive planning model discussed in Chapter 4 was not
specifically followed in the design ofthe JTATF-EAST project, the steps that were taken
during the actual design process are easily related to the model. The design for the
antiterrorism plan for the J1ATF-EAST facility will be used to illustrate how the
comprehensive planning model can be used to design a force protection plan using
CPTED techniques. As noted in the previous section, the model contains the following
steps:













Problem identification is the process of identifying a problem and determining the
goals and objectives for solving it.
Problem : JIATF-EAST's mission to detect and monitor aerial and maritime drug
trafficking in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zones made it
particularly vulnerable to criminals and terrorists connected to the drug trade. Its location
on Truman Annex at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida complicated the problem due
to the open base policy and its proximity to a major tourist destination. The true southern
point ofthe U.S. is also located on the facility. The four-building complex that housed
the activity did not have sufficient standoff distance to withstand the effects of a truck or
car bomb attack. U.S. Atlantic Command LEPS Team conducted a formal threat
assessment for the base the week of 7-1 1 April 1997. The assessment confirmed that the
facility was an open target and vulnerable to attacks from Narco-terrorists.
Goal : While the military representatives admitted they could block off access
points to the buildings with traffic barriers, they wanted a solution that was more
attractive and subtle in its design. The military representatives were interested in a
redesign ofthe vehicle and personnel access to the building to reduce the opportunity of
attacks and damage to the facility. A fence around the four building and enhanced
lighting in the parking areas were important but secondary interests ofthe facility
personnel. Figure 5. 1 is a plan ofthe JIATF-EAST complex.
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Figure 5.1: Plan ofthe JIATF-EAST complex.
Original Map Source: University of Florida College ofArchitecture
Gather Data
The five types of information that needs to be collected when designing physical
space were identified and discussed in Chapter 4 and included:
- Crime analysis information
- Demographic information
- Land use information
- Observations




An interdisciplinary team of faculty, students, and advisors gathered the data and
produced the actual project design. The backgrounds ofthe team members included
security, architecture, planning and landscape architecture. Primary responsibility for the
actual project design was given to two UF classes, a graduate level Defensible Space in
Urban Design course, taught in the Urban and Regional Planning Department (URP) by
Dr. Richard Schneider, and a graduate/undergraduate level Landscape Architecture
Studio, taught by Professor Bob Grist.
Other team members included Professor Steven Luoni, from the UF Department
ofArchitecture, who consulted on the architectural aspects ofthe project. Dr. Ruth
Steiner, from URP, consulted on traffic planning. Officer Sterling Keys, from the City of
Gainesville Police Department, provided consultation on crime prevention and other
security matters.
Crime analysis information
Three experts were consulted as part ofthe research process to provide crime
analysis information. JIATF-EAST's Security Officer, Mr. Alan Mather, and his staff,
provided information on areas that they had already identified as possible security
problems and situations that existed on the facility and in the surrounding area. (One of
the island's high crime areas is Bahama Village, located directly adjacent to the north-
east side ofthe JIATF-EAST annex.)
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Mr. Brian Barstow, from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command provided a
personal presentation to the classes in which he described the method for calculating the
blast analysis for the base, and provided the limits of blast exposure to the buildings
given the explosive strength he was designing for. Mr. Barstow did the analysis based on
a 1000-kg (2,205-Ib.) car bomb, which was based in part on the Oklahoma City blast. He
did not want the impact to the actual building complex to be above 3 pounds per square
inch (psi), which meant a standoff distance of 250 feet from building complex was
required as shown in Figure 5.2. (Also see Blast Analysis Report - Appendix A).
Figure 5.2: Plan ofthe JIATF-EAST complex with blast radius included.
Original Map Source: University ofFlorida College ofArchitecture
Security expert Mr. Dan Briggs, from SEMCO Security Consultants, in
Jacksonville, FL, provided information on the concept of a layered security system and
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on some ofthe technological (mechanical and electrical) devices that are available for
security. Devices described include electrical access control technology, exterior sensors,
and other surveillance equipment.
Demographic information
Mr. Mather and his staffprovided information about the existing activities and
personnel distributions on the facility. In addition to JIATF-EAST, other tenants in the
four-building complex include CARIBROC and Project FLAMINGO, an operation ofthe
National Security Agency (NSA). Both are equally sensitive facilities that are also
considered possible targets for terrorist bomb attacks. JIATF-EAST is located in two of
the four two-story structures in the complex - Building 291 and 290. It shares part of
Building 290 with CARIBROC. Building 1279, the southern-most building, is occupied
on the first floor by several JIATF-EAST directorates and on the second floor by Project
Flamingo. CARIBROC also shares part ofBuilding 289 with Project Flamingo. The
remainder of Building 289 is unoccupied, although there are plans to move additional
personnel into it in the future. (See proceeding Figure 5.1.)
In addition to the different tenants, sections ofthe buildings have different
security level requirements, so personnel with lower security levels cannot go through the
actual building complex, but have to go outside and walk around the buildings to get
from one section to another. One ofthe concerns ofthe security personnel is that
classified documents sometimes need to be carried from one office to another and the




Mr. Alan Mather and his staff also provided information about the existing
physical layout ofthe facility, including specific areas that he had already identified as
security weaknesses. Other land uses on the facility include a Moral, Welfare and
Recreation (MWR) area to the south ofthe complex that hopes to expand in the future.
This expanded area would provide recreational facilities for retired and active duty
military and DOD civilian personnel. Complicating the land use pattern is a regularly
operating church, Building 230, that is located to the north, directly across from the main
entrance ofthe JIATF-EAST complex. A large enlisted barracks, Buildings 437-439, is
located across a sports field from the complex. Family housing is located immediately
behind the complex, to the east An illustration ofthe complex and the surrounding
facility with site constraints is shown in Figure 5.3.
The Naval Air Station at Truman Annex is also included in the military
downsizing program known as Base Reorganization and Closing (BRAC). Due to this,
part ofthe base will be transferred to the City ofKey West for public or private
development. Mr. Scott Legeaux from Bermillo Associates, a Miami-based A&E firm,
discussed the adjacent BRAC property and the possible affect it could have on the future
configuration ofthe base. The BRAC property is located east ofthe church and includes
the Seminole Battery, ruins of a historic munitions storage and gun battery located to the




Primary research included site visits and client critiques and feedback. Two she
visits were conducted at the base in Key West. The first visit was done by a group of
faculty during the spring of 1997, in order to more clearly define the scope ofthe project.
The second visit was with the students in the fall of 1997, and included physical field
research ofthe site and facilities.
Resident or user interviews
Our main client representative, Mr. Mather, provided information and was the
primary person interviewed; however, the students also talked to other personnel on and
around the site during the site visit.
Analyze
Analyzing data involves using the information that has been gathered to identify
strengths and weaknesses. Once the data was collected the classes analyzed the data both
independently and collectively with a view towards developing a comprehensive design
strategy.
Constraints
Several specific areas of concern were identified either by the students and faculty
or by the client representatives. These areas of concern fell into three basic categories:
general, vehicular or travel oriented, and building layout.
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Major design constraints included an active church/chapel located immediately next to
the complex, and the Bahama Village and BRAC property (including the Seminole
Battery), immediately adjacent to the site. Further, the base commander does not directly
control the MWR property and military recreational area at the south side ofthe site.
One ofthe major travel related concerns was the uncontrolled access to the site,
both vehicular and pedestrian, due to the open base policy. Many ofKey West's tourists
walk or drive onto the base without realizing it is a military installation, or that there are
sensitive facilities in the area. Access into the base is possible through two separate
gates, one at United Street and one at Southard Street. It was also observed that the
residents ofthe military housing next to the complex had been using a short cut that went
directly through the JIATF-EAST complex
Another major concern was that vehicular traffic was able to use roads located
only a few yards away from the buildings, allowing no standoff distance. Parking for the
buildings was located immediately adjacent to two ofthe buildings and is inadequate for
the number of staffworking in the complex Parking for the nearby chapel was also a
concern. The loading dock, which needed to be accessible to 18-wheeler trucks, was
perceived to be another weak point in the complex. Several other security issues were
identified including possible access across the open athletic field to the north and
vehicular access to the dumpster near the rear walkway between building 29 land
building 290. The chain link fence surrounding a couple ofthe compound buildings
(note it did not surround all four) was also in poor condition and needed repair. Several
ofthe above site constraints are identified in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Partial plan ofNaval Air Station Truman Annex with Site Constraints:
(1) Church, (2) Bahama village, (3) Seminole Battery, (4) MWR Property, (5) United
Street (gate beyond), (6) Southard Street (gate beyond), (7) Military Housing, (8) Roads
adjacent to Complex, (9) Parking adjacent to Complex, (10) Proposed Loading Dock,
(11) Athletic Field, (12) Dumpsters.
Original Map Source: University of Florida College ofArchitecture
74

The building layout concerns were varied. The entrances to the various structures
were not well defined and did not lead to a sense of territorially. They were also not very
secure and tended to have blind spots, blocked by concrete stairwell screens. The four
buildings had different security ratings; however, personnel needed to be able to move
from one building to another in a secure fashion. VTP's sometimes visited the facility,
which traditionally required a ceremonial entrance be available so they could be dropped
off immediately adjacent to the building. As previously noted fences were chain link and
did not surround the whole complex and they fences were old and in need ofrepair.
Lighting and CCTV coverage were considered inadequate around some ofthe buildings
and around the parking lots (see insert section for Design Option 1 at the back ofthis
section).
Opportunities
The major opportunity present in this project was that the base personnel
(particularly the security officer) were willing to be flexible and open to new approaches
to security, which allowed the CPTED/planning and design approach to be explored.
They had rejected the extreme target hardening that others wanted to impose initially and
so were willing to look at other options. Another opportunity identified was that there
was enough open space available around the complex to reconfigure the roads and




After the data was analyzed, design options were developed based on the analysis
and on the stated goals and objectives ofthe project. There were three phases ofdesign
options for the JIATF-EAST project. The first two ofthese phases went through the
reevaluation process identified by the arrows in the comprehensive planning model.
Preliminary Design Options
The first round of design solutions consisted of 16 designs done by individual
students in the landscape architecture studio, in consultation with the students in the URP
class. These designs addressed many ofthe concerns found during the site visit. Based
on feed back from the faculty and URP graduate students, the designs were grouped into
three categories based on cost and feasibility: I) Economical, 2) Practical, and 3)
Expensive. Three teams were formed based on these categories in order to create a more
concise, narrower set of design options, and in order to lessen the rigidity of design
authorship.
Many ofthe preliminary designs introduced ideas that directly enforced the
CPTED concepts. Some used barriers ofvarying types and construction, but disguised
them as something that could actually serve another function, enforcing the idea of
activity placement. A concrete based grouping of flagpoles near the entrance ofthe
building was a good example ofthis. Several ofthe designs tried to bring the users out
onto the site to improve surveillance. One ofthese ideas was to design a running path
around the open field at the North side ofthe site. Another design built a pedestrian
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boardwalk along the southwest perimeter ofthe site, bordering the ocean and the tower
farm.
Once design options were developed they were again subjected to the planning
process. Problems must be identified and analyzed based on additional data that has been
gathered. Some ofthe preliminary designs had specific problem areas that were analyzed
in the review based on the additional information from the faculty and the graduate
students.
Many ofthe ideas were not reasonable from a cost standpoint, or were not
practical. For example, one design included a moat around the main complex. This idea
was borrowed from examples ofhistorical defense, but perhaps took these a little too
literally. A weakness present in most ofthe presentations was a lack of signage, which
would enforce the concepts ofterritoriality and access control. Many ofthe preliminary
designs had parking lots that were located too close to the building. There also seemed to
be a heavy reliance on card swipes at entrances to parking lots and roadways in many of
the designs. This led to a discussion about curving the roads, a concept borrowed from
medieval times, the Asian city examples, and the Beirut and Bahrain case studies, to
reduce the possibility of cars being able to accelerate on the straight road and crash
through the gate arms. Several ofthe designs brought up issues that had not been
previously discussed, such as emergency vehicle access, and separation ofparking for the





As noted above, three intermediate sets if design options were developed based on
the feedback from the first set of 16 options. The three intermediate designs were
presented two weeks after the preliminary design presentation. During this review
additional information was available from activity representatives present at the
presentation. Representatives from the facility included the JIATF East Chiefthe Staff,
Colonel Joe Gorman, USAF, the JIATF East Staff Civil Engineer, Commander Paul
Mitchell, USN, Physical Security Officer Alan Mather, and ChiefWarrant Officer
Ronald Howell, USMC, the Counterintelligence Officer who assisted in performing the
JIATF-EAST threat assessment. Also present were the chair ofthe URP program, the
Vice Provost ofthe University of Florida, and students and faculty working on the
project.
This presentation allowed the students to test their design concepts in public and it
encouraged the feedback from the clients which was essential to producing a final design
and planning solution. Comments and critiques for each ofthe Design Options may be
found in the Appendix ofthis paper.
Select Options
Once design options were developed, the options were evaluated in order to
identify any problems or conflicts, such as fire and safety access to buildings, etc. As
indicated by the arrows in the comprehensive planning model, the planning process
should be repeated to solve problems identified. Once the problems are worked out, the
most reasonable options should be selected. As noted above, the military representatives
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reviewed the three intermediate design options in depth and ultimately chose the aspects
they liked best in each to make up the final comprehensive design. The final design is
illustrated in Figure 5.4, and a color rendition ofthe final design is located in the




Figure 5.4: JIATF-EAST Final Design




One ofthe main, overall design concepts in final design was to separate the base
into several zones, cutting off access across the base in order to avoid unnecessary and
unauthorized traffic near the JIATF-EAST facility. For example, the housing residents
on the south-east side ofthe site can only enter the housing area through the United Street
gate to the south-east, they can not enter the base from the Southard Street gate to the
north and drive through the base. The MWR patrons and the residents ofthe barracks on
the west side ofthe site can only gain access to their respective areas through the
northern, Southard Street gate.
As mentioned above, a breakdown ofthe individual design elements and the
CPTED strategies they are related to follows. The design elements are broken down and
separated in order to promote a better understanding ofhow the individual elements
illustrate the specific CPTED concepts and how all the elements combine together to
create a comprehensive planning strategy for the facility.
Territoriality
(See Figure 5.5)
1. Install proper signage throughout the base to mark territory and increase the sense of
territoriality; in particular, install proper signage to keep trucks from entering the
Dekalb parking area.
2. Fence or barricade the north parking lot to prevent vehicle access and delineate the
BRAC property from the base, which indicates territoriality.
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3. Fence and landscape the Seminal Battery area in order to separate it from the base
territory and identify it as part on the BRAC territory. (This is also a form ofimage
and milieu under the maintenance principle).
Surveillance
(See Figure 5.5)
4. Provide a manned gate on Southard Street. (Also promotes access control and
territorially).
5. Integration of lighting and CCTV into the design around the core buildings.
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Figure 5.5: JIATF-EAST - Territoriality and Surveillance Elements
Original Map Source: University ofFlorida College ofArchitecture
Access Control
(See Figure 5.6)
6. Close ofFpart ofCovington Avenue in order to deny vehicles access immediately
adjacent to the building. Close offby placing concrete or metal bollards and covering
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the asphalt with grass allowing a pedestrian walkway of 10'. This will separate the
housing area from the work area, creating zones ofuse and mobility.
7. Put an overhead truck barrier on Dekalb Avenue and a truck turnaround to keep
trucks from entering the Dekalb parking area.
8. Expand Dekalb parking lot and provide for a controlled parking area
9. Control use ofVIP drive through card readers.
10. Use bollards as access control to separate the Dekalb Avenue exit from the parking
lot.
11. Close off part of Southard Street in order to deny vehicles access immediately
adjacent to the building and to get rid ofthe long straight run ofroad that leads to the
main building. This was to be accomplished by placing concrete or metal bollards and
covering the asphalt with grass allowing a pedestrian walkway of 10'.
12. Line the athletic field with palm trees and boulders to keep vehicles from cutting
across the field and approaching the buildings. (This is also a form ofimage and
milieu under the maintenance principle).
13. Landscape between the barracks buildings to keep vehicles from cutting across the
field and approaching the buildings. (This is also a form ofimage and milieu under
the maintenance principle).
14. Turn Truman Avenue into an internal access path inside the new fenced area to
increase access control. This will separate the work area from the recreational and
barracks area, creating the zones.
15. Install fence around all four buildings to increase access control.
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16. Use a proximity card reader controlled barrier at the entrance to building 437 parking
lot.
17. Provide an electric sliding gate with a proximity card reader controls as access control
to a new fenced loading dock and dumpster area.
18. Put an overhead truck barrier at entrance to building 1279 parking lot.






V.LP. Entrance and Dftpof
FadaMan Pathway
Narrowed toff
Figure 5.6: JIATF-EAST - Access Control Elements





20. Install jogging path around the athletic field to encourage territoriality and increase
surveillance. This is also a good example of activity placement, considering that
many ofthe military personnel run as part oftheir and daily routine and training. (It
also illustrates natural surveillance and territoriality).
21. Expand building 437 parking lot and landscape with palm trees and boulders (this
will provide image and milieu as well as access control.)
Maintenance
(See Figure 5.7)
22. General increase in landscaping.
23. Landscape road to building 1279 parking lot to separate the MWR property from
JIATF, creating territoriality and access control through use ofpalm trees and
boulders.
24. Eliminate parking in front of main building and landscape with flagpole arrangement
to create more of a corporate image. This will also increase the sense ofterritoriality
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Figure 5.7: JIATF-EAST - Activity Placement and Maintenance Elements
Original Map Source: University ofFlorida College ofArchitecture
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Many ofthe above design strategies for the final plan for the JIATF-EAST she illustrate
a combination ofthe five basic CPTED principles. The following matrix (Table 5.1)
shows how these principles overlap for each ofthe individual JIATF-EAST final design
elements.
Design Element Territoriality Surveillance Access Control Activity Place. Maintenance
1. Install proper signage X X
2. Fence north parking lot X X
3. Fence and landscape
the Seminal Battery X X X
4. Manned gate on Southard St. X X X
5. Lighting & CCTV X
6. Close part of Covington Ave. X
7. Overhead truck barrier &
turnaround on Dekalb Ave. X X
8. Expand & control Dekalb parking X X X
9. Control use of VIP drive X X
10. Separate Dekalb parking & exit X X
1 1 . Close off part of Southard St. X
12. Line the athletic field
w/ palm trees & boulders X X
13. Landscape areas btwn barracks X X
14. Turn Truman Ave. into
an internal access path X X
15. Install fence around buildings X X
16. Card reader at Bldg.437 parking X
17. Card reader at loading dock
& dumpster area. X
18. Overhead truck barrier
at Bldg. 1279 parking lot X X
19. Expand Bldg. 1279 parking,
include sidewalk & turnstile. X X
20. Install jogging path X X X
21. Expand Bldg. 437 parking
& landscape X X X
22. General increase in landscaping X X
23. Landscape road btwn Bldg. 1279
parking & MWR property X X X
24. Eliminate parking & landscape
in front of main building X X X
Table 5.1: Matrix ofJIATF-EAST Design Elements
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The above suggestions, taken together, create a layered system of zones, blocks
and barriers. The CPTED concepts were used and combined to create a comprehensive
design for JIATF-EAST. The final design should improve security by hardening the
targets, increasing the usefulness ofthe outdoor spaces, while providing an aesthetically
pleasing environment in which people can live and work
Implement
The implementation phase involves the process ofputting the selected options in
place. JIATF-EAST representatives were delighted with the finished product and were
excited about the changes that had been recommended. Although most ofthe changes
have not been implemented as ofthis time, (enhanced lighting was recently implemented)
JIATF-EAST personnel submitted funding requests for the various projects and recently
received $850,000 to actually make many ofthe changes suggested.
Evaluate
Once the selected options have been implemented they should be reevaluated on a
regular basis to determine ifthey remain effective. Evaluation should follow the
planning process, as indicated by the arrows in the model.
This project was unusual in that it had a very diverse group ofpeople working on
it. Not only were there both military and civilian personnel working on the project, there
were two separate classes representing two different academic and professional
disciplines. This led to members ofthe group having both different approaches and
different work methods. The military tradition is one ofpractical solutions with little
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regard for aesthetics, and a heavy use of intimidating looking fences and blockades. The
civilian tradition tends to be more aesthetic, but still has a tendency to rely heavily on
technical devices such as electronic alarms and CCTV. The addition ofthe CPTED
concepts puts a third, entirely new twist on the whole thought process.
The design part ofthe project relied on the landscape architecture class doing the
actual drawings and designs and the planning class acting as CPTED consultants The
landscape architecture class was a six-hour lab. The students, who were a mix of
graduates and undergraduates, tended to work long hours and tended to do much ofthen-
work immediately before the projects were due. These work methods were mainly due to
the time constraints oftheir labor-intensive program They were also not as familiar with
the CPTED concepts and tended to be more concerned about the environmental and the
aesthetic aspects ofthe project than were their planning counterparts.
In the graduate planning class, which was a three hour course on CPTED, the
students tended to be more concerned with the concepts and they tended to want to see
their ideas developed earlier. These conflicts between ideas and methodology probably
led to some frustration on the part ofboth groups ofthe students, with the landscape
students feeling harassed and the planning students feeling ignored, at least some ofthe
time. Given the diversity in the group, it was difficult to see at the start ofthe project
how an end product, that would be acceptable to all parties, would be achieved.
The process did work however. The three stages of design with their
accompanying discussions and critiques achieved a process that was, in many ways, like
a funnel. From an abundance of ideas, individual concepts were sifted out and agreed
upon, and then molded until finally, a few were left that meshed well together into a
90

cohesive design. The concepts ofCPTED were followed, and in many cases the ideas
used to implement these concepts were both unique and effective. The
comprehensiveness ofthe final product, and the enthusiasm ofthe customer, is testimony






The section of the report will examine the official antiterrorism andplanning
policyfor the Navy. The policy will be reviewed in order to determine the present role of
facilities planning inforce protection. The current Department ofDefense (DOD)
Antiterrorism Handbook and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA VFAC)
Security Engineering Course will also be reviewed and rated on their incorporation of
the CPTED principles.
Current Antiterrorism Policy
In order to determine how planning and CPTED principles could be incorporated
into Navy antiterrorism policy in the future, several ofthe current policy guidelines were
examined. Navy policy on terrorism is governed by DOD Directive O-2000. 12, which
establishes that it is policy "to protect DOD personnel and their families, facilities, and
other material resources from terrorists acts. . . " (DOD 0-2000. 1 2-H, pg. 1-3). In
accordance with this directive, DOD 0-2000. 1 2-H, the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook,
Protection ofDOD Personnel and Activities against Acts ofTerrorism and Political
Turbulence, came out in February of 1993. An updated instruction is currently being
written, but is not available for review at this time; therefore the 1993 handbook will be
used as the basis ofNavy policy for this paper.
92

Outline of Force Protection Policy
The DOD Antiterrorism Handbook (the Handbook) is intended to be a reference
document to assist DOD Components in designing, developing, implementing and
evaluating effective programs to reduce the risk ofterrorist attack and mitigate its effects
should it occur. It is a comprehensive document divided into four major sections that
cover a variety ofterrorism related issues. It also contains several appendices containing
useful material in list format, designed to be used for awareness or education programs.
Section one ofthe Handbook includes background information about terrorism,
U.S. policies, structure ofDOD organization, and legal constraints. Section two presents
security concepts such as threat analysis and warning, risk assessment, physical security
policies and physical security techniques. Section three outlines measures that can be
taken by individuals to reduce personal risk. Section four addresses problems and
solutions with respect to protecting units, facilities, and installations, and includes crisis
management, bomb threat responses and other related topics.
This paper is concerned only with the sections ofthe handbook that relate to
facility planning and protection, and will therefore concentrate on physical security and
other planning related initiatives. While the Handbook does discuss some planning
aspects, one of its weaknesses is that it does not graphically illustrate many ofthe
concepts it discusses. Pictorial examples would probably make it much easier for
personnel with non-technical backgrounds to understand. The Handbook will be rated




In addition to the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, the U.S. Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) conducts a comprehensive design training course in
Security Engineering for its facilities security personnel. This course covers all levels of
security and security threat including terrorism Many elements ofplanning are covered
in this course, although in most cases they are not specifically labeled as planning issues.
In the same sense, many aspects ofCPTED are also discussed, though they are not
specifically labeled CPTED techniques. These CPTED related aspects will be discussed
in detail at the end ofthis section.
The course summary, notes, and overheads, which are what this paper uses to
make an evaluation, cover a number of security issues from petty theft to terrorism and
attacks by environmental and nuclear activists. The threats are labeled in order of
seriousness. Vehicle bombs and their effects on structures are also discussed along with
vehicle barrier test reports for vehicles hitting different types of barriers at various
speeds. Effectiveness of barriers, including estimated penetration times with various
tools and weapons are discussed. There is a section on lighting type and efficiency, and
recommendations for lighting types and levels for various areas. Interior and exterior
alarm systems and system configurations are discussed in detail, as are doors and related
hardware, windows, CCTV systems, and general security equipment such as safes.
The NAVFAC class reviews the design process, illustrating many individual
design techniques and discussing their effectiveness. It talks a great deal about protecting
individual facilities but does not stress comprehensive base planning, nor does it mention
traffic calming. The course makes a case for planning by stressing the cost savings
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between planned systems and retrofitting. However, there does not seem to be a clear
link between security and planning. Although the class was originally designed for
engineers and facilities personnel, the organizational flowcharts all discuss the Naval
Investigative Service Command (N1SCOM) which is the security branch ofthe Navy.
While the course seems very comprehensive and includes some good information and
excellent graphics, it is unlikely that this information is readily available to personnel
who do not take the course.
Role of Planning
In both the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook and the Security Engineering course,
working level responsibility for security is given almost exclusively to security and
security personnel with almost no reference to, or mention ofplanning, planners and
facility personnel. The planning instruction does not mention antiterrorism at all and
contains only a minor mention ofphysical security. Given the tone ofthe instructions, it
would seem doubtful that the security personnel and the planning and facilities personnel
work together to develop comprehensive programs for facilities. This is one area in
which the DOD program as a whole could be improved and it will be discussed further in
the conclusion ofthis paper.
Role ofPlanning in Antiterrorism Policy
As mentioned above, the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook shows that responsibility
for security and antiterrorism is given almost exclusively to security and intelligence
agencies. A major part ofthe emphasis ofthe handbook is on threat analysis and
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vulnerability assessment. It contains a great deal of information on how to accomplish
these tasks, most ofwhich are performed by security and intelligence personnel. While it
also mentions many facility planning issues, is does not actually mention planners or
facilities personnel.
The handbook does emphasize the importance ofphysical security systems in
combating terrorism. Many ofthe security initiatives suggested are technical, however,
non-technical concepts such as access control and barrier systems are also discussed.
Types ofphysical barriers and other physical security systems are examined in detail.
Physical planning of individual systems is discussed several times, however it is
not clear whether it is the security personnel or the planning and facilities personnel who
are expected to do this. The only allusion to comprehensive facility planning is in the
section on security considerations for new construction at new DOD sites. Although this
section mentions planning functions such as the facility siting, layout of facilities and site
selection for new facilities, interfacing with planning personnel is not actually mentioned.
This makes it seem that it is the security officer's responsibility to make sure security is a
consideration in planning new facilities.
The only place in the handbook where consultation with facilities personnel is
mentioned is in the section on physical security for a facility. This section deals with the
architectural details required to physically harden individual buildings. Here the
handbook suggests contacting service civil engineering organizations in order to get




The current Navy planning instruction is the NAVFACINST 1 1010.44, the Shore
Facilities Planning Manual published by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC). Security is mentioned only briefly in the manual and antiterrorism is not
mentioned at all. This manual was last updated in 1990. There dre no current plans to
rewrite the instruction, although amendments and supplemental policy by separate
directives have come out and are expected to continue in the future.
A supplemental instruction, the Interim Technical Guidance (ITG) for
Antiterrorism. Force Protection, and Physical Security ofPersonnel in OCONUS
Housing Facilities, was issued on March 26, 1998. Although it only officially covers
new, Military Construction (MCON) housing projects, it goes into more detail about the
role of facilities personnel and planners in antiterrorism than the previous instructions do.
This three page document outlines some ofthe steps required to do a plan and includes
the need for a survey done by a team of activity personnel, planners, designers, and
security specialists. It also offers specific guidance on how to protect buildings from
exterior explosive attacks.
As illustrated by the above guidance, planning for antiterrorism tends to be a
priority mainly on MCON projects. These are large military construction projects that
require congressional approval due to the high dollar amounts involved. Planning
initiatives for these projects mainly deal with setback requirements based on risk
analysis. However, other planning aspects, such as access control, orientation and
building siting, are also mentioned as considerations. Planning for antiterrorism is not
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emphasized for smaller projects or for upgrades at the present time, due in part to the
perceived costs of such upgrades [2].
Other Planning Initiatives
At the present time the Navy does not offer a course or have an instruction for
planners and facility personnel about antiterrorism and facility design. Although the
Security Engineering Course discusses some aspects ofboth, it is mainly a course about
general security. It does not cover how to calculate a bomb blast radius, or how to do
comprehensive base planning.
Some planners at the engineering field divisions have taken classes on security
and terrorism, and have worked with facilities where the security threat is particularly
high and security design was actually put in place. Through these experiences they
developed an understanding ofthe principles and have become technical "experts" in
security design. These personnel now act as consultants when other planning, facility
and security personnel need special assistance with security design. They do bomb blast
calculations for facilities and calculate required setbacks. Some ofthe experts at
LANTDIV have expressed an interest in additional training, and in particular in a course
or manual designed specifically for planners and facility personnel on security and
antiterrorism design [3].
It is interesting to note that the experts at LANTDIV had not taken the Security
Engineering Course at the time this paper was written, although they were scheduled to
attend in the fell of 1998. They also reported the class sponsors had requested that major
facilities send both a facility person and a security person to the class. This indicates that
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there does seem to be an effort to try to remedy the disconnect between planning and
security personnel, although this may also have been an arbitrary decision and the
disconnect may not have been specifically identified as a problem.
As mentioned above, the cover letter to the supplemental instruction, Interim
Technical Guidance (ITG) for Antiterrorism. Force Protection, and Physical Security of
Personnel in OCONUS Housing Facilities, also offers some guidance to facilities
personnel. This letter provides some foresight into the role the Navy would eventually
like its facilities personnel to play in the antiterrorism effort. The letter states that
"NAVFAC's policy is to provide customers with cost effective antiterrorism and physical
security systems as an integrated part ofthe facility planning, engineering, and design
process" (NAVFAC, 1997, pg. 1).
Although the letter states that the customer is still required to provide criteria for
threats, risks, vulnerability and criticality assessments ofproposed projects, NAVFAC
and its subordinate commands are made responsible for reviewing projects for
compliance with the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook. The letter requests that NAVFAC
Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs), Engineering Field Activities (EFAs) and Public
Works Centers (PWCs) designate a point of contact for antiterrorism and that this person
be familiar with the DOD and NAVFAC antiterrorism instructions. It also encourages
antiterrorism training for planners and designers. It directs planners to ensure that
antiterrorism criteria is included in activity master planning studies and tells them to
assist customers in locating facilities in accordance with safe standoff distances
(NAVFAC, 1997). Again, although the supplemental guidance only officially covers
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new, Military Construction (MCON) housing projects, it does indicate what part facilities
personnel and planners should play in antiterrorism in the future.
The Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center has a security assessment team
in their Security Engineering Division which is also mentioned in the ITG cover letter.
This team publishes instructions on specific aspects ofphysical security, such as
effectiveness ofwindows and barriers. The assessment team also applies risk analysis
methodology to provide recommendations for security improvements for military
activities (Federal Facilities Council, 1997). However, they do charge for their services,
so an activity would probably have to have an identifiable threat in order to be able to
justify getting assistance from them
Although there are several problems with the DOD and Navy systems, offering
remedies to these problems is often easier said than done. The Department ofDefense is
a huge organization and as such, faces many ofthe conflicts inherent in an entity of its
size and complexity. These difficulties and the disconnect between planning and security
will be discussed further in the conclusion ofthis paper.
Comparison of Current Naw Policy with CPTED Principles
This section ofthe paper reviews and ranks the DOD Handbook O-2000. 12-H and
the NAVFAC Security Engineering Course according to their inclusion ofCPTED
principles noted in the previous chapters. This review was done in order to establish a
baseline with the purpose of determining how and to what extent CPTED principles
should be incorporated into Navy planning practices. The rankings, which are
100

summarized in Table 6. 1 and Table 6.2, are based on the observations ofthe writer and
was not determined by any formal or scientific method.
POD Handbook 0-2000. 12-H
DOD Handbook 0-2000. 12-H, Protection ofDOD Personnel and Activities
against Acts ofTerrorism and Political Turbulence was published in February of 1993.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the handbook delegates working level
responsibility for antiterrorism almost exclusively to security personnel. While the
handbook does mention facility planning issues, there is almost no reference to, or
mention ofplanning, planners and facility personnel. The only allusion to comprehensive
facility planning is in the section on security considerations for construction at new DOD
sites. Planning functions such as the facility siting, layout of facilities, and site selection
for new facilities are mentioned in this section. Most ofthe security initiatives suggested
would fall under the "mechanical" designation, as noted previously. While the handbook
encourages the use oftechnology and people ~ the most costly elements in security — the





Adherence to CPTED Principles
Ranking Poor P-M Moderate M-H High






Emphasis on Natural X
Use of Organized X
Use of Mechanical X
Comprehensive Planning X
Planner &Security as Team X
Table 6.1: Matrix ofthe DOD Antiterrorism Handbooks
Adherence to CPTED Principles
1. Territoriality
The DOD handbook included the following items that were related to the CPTED
principle of territoriality:
- The use ofpsychological boundaries such as signs, hedges delineating property lines,
and closed doors (also related to access control).
- It mentions the need to avoid the "fortress effect" look in some locations.
This reviewer gave the handbook a poor to moderate score for the territoriality
principle because it made no mention of trying to create a sense of ownership in the
facilities' users.
2. Surveillance




- Mentions clear zones and controlling vegetation so as not to block views.
- For new DOD sites, the handbook mentions that the building should be sited at the
high point of a land track and that there should be a 100-foot minimum setback from
the perimeter ofthe facility. It also mentions keeping parking away from the
building.
This reviewer gave the handbook a moderate score for the surveillance principle because
it emphasized electronic surveillance instead ofnatural. It also included a requirement
for buildings to be conductive to grilling or eliminating all windows below 16-foot level,
which is contradictory to natural surveillance.
3. Access Control
Access control was a major emphasis ofthe handbook, which included the
following items that were related to this principle:
- Entry and circulation control, and access delay were all discussed in relationship to
access control.
- Barrier systems are a major emphasis. The handbook discusses a layered system of
barriers and many specific barrier types, both mechanical and natural, and their
effectiveness. Some natural barriers are described in detail.
This reviewer gave the handbook a moderate to high score for the access control
principle. While it did include many natural access control elements; it also heavily




The handbook included the following items that were related to this principle:
- Consideration ofhow contractors, vendors, and other visitors are identified, granted
access to, and controlled once they enter the facility when assessing vulnerability.
Consideration ofparking locations and accessibility when assessing vulnerability.
- Notation that DOD typically erects structures that must stand for 25 to 100 years, so
uses may change drastically.
This reviewer gave the handbook a poor score for the activity placement principle.
While it mentioned the fact that activities are likely to change and that some activities
could create risk, it made no mention ofusing activity placement to promote natural
surveillance, territoriality, and natural access control.
5. Maintenance
The handbook included the following item that was related to this principle:
Inspection and maintenance of barrier systems and security components is mentioned.
This reviewer gave the handbook a poor to moderate score for the maintenance principle.
While it did not mention the psychological aspects of maintenance, the physical
maintenance portion covered all systems, both mechanical and natural
NAVFAC Security Engineering Course
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the NAVFAC Security Engineering Course
does include several elements ofplanning in h, including the use of some initiatives
based on CPTED related strategies. The course notes include a case study on CPTED
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showing the cost savings ifthese techniques were used early in the planning and design
process. The case study is the only place in which "CPTED" is actually mentioned and
the specific concepts and principles ofCPTED are not actually discussed.
The course has several major drawbacks. Although it mentions planning it does
not go into any detail regarding comprehensive planning. It also does not discuss or
encourage a partnership between facilities and security personnel. It relies more heavily
on organized and mechanical security solutions than in natural solutions. Also, it is
related to overall security, not specifically to terrorism. Although the course does discuss
bomb blasts and terrorism as a security risk, it does not appear to discuss these in
relationship to the CPTED related concepts. Note that this evaluation is based on course
notes and overheads only, not attendance. Some ofthe principles may have been
discussed in more detail in the actual course presentation; however, it should be noted
that the course materials generally give one a good indication ofthe substance of course
coverage.
NAVFAC Security Engineering Course
Adherence to CPTED Principles
Ranking Poor P-M Moderate M-H High






Emphasis on Natural X
Use of Organized X
Use of Mechanical X
Comprehensive Planning X
Planner &Security as Team X
Table 6.2: Matrix ofthe NAVFAC Security Engineering Courses




The NAVFAC Security Engineering course included the following Herns that
were related to the CPTED principle of territoriality:
The use ofpersonnel working in the area as part of detection resource.
- Psychological impact created by removing perceived opportunity as a basic security
design technique.
- Psychological deterrence, defined as letting people know security measures have been
taken without being obtrusive, through the use of signs, fences, lighting, alarms,
highly visible locks, etc.
This reviewer gave the course a moderate score for the territoriality principle. While it
does mention the use ofpersonnel for detection, it also made no mention of trying to
create a sense of ownership in the facilities users.
2. Surveillance
The course included the following items that were related to this principle:
- Goal ofvisibility enhancement is to make people believe they will be seen ifthey do
something wrong.
- Achievement of goal through design and layout. Design suggestions included:
putting windows in supervisors offices and in small, enclosed spaces; use of low
partitions, not walls; locate reception desk for maximum viewing; use low shrubs and
unbroken walls.
Some emphasis on lighting
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This reviewer gave the course a moderate to high score for the surveillance principle
because it emphasized many natural techniques, although it also relied heavily on
electronic surveillance.
3. Access Control
The course included the following items that were related to this principle:
- Controlling, channeling, and limiting access as a basic part of security design.
- Utilizing zones to control access, noting that locks cannot substitute for layout by
zones; during working hours, locks impair productivity.
Some utilization ofpassive barriers.
This reviewer gave the course a moderate score for the access control principle. While it
did include many natural access control elements; it also heavily stressed mechanical and
organized access control.
4. Activity Placement
The course included the following items that were related to this principle:
It listed enhancing visibility by locating workstations to provide good visibility by
and ofemployees and visitors as a basic security design technique.
- It mentioned the use of employees for "casual surveillance," to reduce the guard
force.
This reviewer gave the course a moderate to high score for the activity placement
principle. It mentioned using activity placement to promote natural surveillance, though




The Security Engineering course did not appear to mention maintenance at all and
so this reviewer gave it a poor rating for the maintenance principle.
In summary, the Security Engineering Course included more ofCPTED
principles on the whole than the Antiterrorism Handbook did. Still, as shown by the
examples in the CPTED principles, there are many ideas that can be used and
incorporated into target protection strategies that were not touched on in either one ofthe
manuals. Both sources relied much more highly on the mechanical and organizational
security methods, than on natural methods. Although some CPTED principles are
included in these guidelines, there is definitely an opportunity to include more ofthe
principles in DOD and Navy security planning strategies. The more natural CPTED
methods also tend to be much more cost effective than mechanical and organizational






This section will discuss the advantages ofusing CPTED in antiterrorism.
Advantages include will be aesthetics, public perception, cost, and an overall increase in
base security. Future opportunities will be discussed, in particular the opportunity to
have security andplanning work as a team. It will also discuss constraints, including the
difficulties in retrofitting existing bases vs. using the techniques on newfacilities. An
additional constraint which will be discussed is the difficulty oflarge organizations to
adapt to new ideas.
Advantages of using CPTED
There are many advantages to using CPTED as a method of security against
terrorism. Some ofthe main reasons are the aesthetic advantages ofusing more natural
approaches to security and also the cost advantages over organized and mechanical
methods.
Aesthetics and Public Perception
Time and time again aesthetics and public perception are given as reasons for lack
of security measures at facilities. In the case ofthe October 1983 bombing ofthe Marine
barracks in Beirut, U.S. military officials argued that "erecting ... obstacles around U.S.
posts in Lebanon would create a bunker appearance inappropriate to the peacekeeping
role" (Beck, 1983, pg. 89). French officials agreed, even though they had recently lost
almost 60 paratroopers in a similar attack.
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Image is important in U.S. Embassy design, which has a goal of allowing for open
diplomatic relations and calls for a welcoming atmosphere (Rosenheck, 1993, DuPont,
1996). The 1985 State Department Commission, recommended design criteria to help
protect embassies against terrorism such as:
10-15 acre site capacity,
100-foot setback for all structures, and
- complex to be of separate constructions to allow for multiple barriers ofpenetration
as an added security measure.
While these recommendations allow and encourage CPTED and other passive
defense strategies, other restrictions include:
- minimum opening for fenestration and windows, comprising no more than 30% of all
public facades,
- 9-foot-high perimeter wall around the complex, and
- maximum oftwo access gates (DuPont, 1 996).
These other restrictions, while they may help improve security, tend to create an
atmosphere of isolation and mistrust. After the recent embassy bombings in Africa, a
U.S. businessman described the U.S. embassy in Tanzania as "a fortress," and said "I
always complained to the ambassador that it left the impression Americans didn't trust
Africans" (Greve, 1998). Often, fortress-like security methods isolate the diplomats and
make it difficult for them to do their jobs (Kempster and Meisler, 1998).
The U.S. military is also becoming more sensitive to the value ofpublic opinion
and has been striving to improve relations with local communities. CPTED, by using a
natural approach based on the placement of activity, offers a more aesthetic and less
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threatening alternative to traditional security techniques. Using more aesthetic and
friendly security measures may help foster cooperation and affinity with the local
cornmunity. They can also improve the environment for personnel working and living on
the base.
Cost
The DOD Antiterrorism Handbook stresses the importance of cost-effectiveness
in designing a security system Using CPTED strategies can have significant cost saving
over traditional security techniques. Not only can the up front cost be considerably less,
the long term costs are almost certain to be a substantial saving over having to pay
salaries for organizational security, or having to pay for long-term maintenance and
power costs for electrical/mechanical elements (Moreno, 1996, Post, 1995).
Defensive architecture expert Eve E. Hinman, in her lecture on reducing the
effects ofbomb blasts on structures, emphasizes that "increasing standoff is usually the
most cost effective way ofproviding protection" (Hinman, 1997). Curt P. Betts, from the
U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, Protective Design Center agrees that "application of
(environmental design) principles results in more efficient, less costly solutions to very
complex security problems" (Betts, 1993).
In addition to the financial cost saving, CPTED methods are also more sustainable
than traditional electrical and mechanical security. Because they do not involve a
continual drain on resources such as electricity, the cost to the environment ofusing these
methods is much less.
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General Increase in Security
Using CPTED techniques for antiterrorism is also likely to increase general
security in other areas. CPTED was designed to reduce more common crimes such as
theft, assault, etc. Studies have proved empirically that a number ofthese methods are
indeed effective (Sherman, 1997). The process of designing CPTED strategies into a
base design for antiterrorism is likely to result in a reduction in other crimes on the base
as well.
Future Constraints
There are both physical and organizational constraints involved with
incorporating CPTED into force protection. The physical constraints would be a problem
in any area, not just on military facilities. The organizational constraints are also not
limited just to the DOD organizations or the Navy in specific, they are general constraints
that likely to occur in any large organization.
Retrofitting Existing Bases vs. New Facilities
Physical constraints are a concern when working with existing facilities or in a
defined or limited area. It can be difficult to achieve proper setbacks for access control,
and natural surveillance when working with existing structures, particularly ifthe
structures are historic and thus cannot undergo major alterations. In these situations




Obviously there is a need to consider reasonableness in dealing with exiting
facilities. The past case studies have shown a tendency for the assessors to underestimate
the bomb blast size for the area. Therefore, while it is recommended to have some area
around targets, the recommended 100 feet of standoff distance may not be cost effective
given the changes needed to achieve it. Again, principles such as natural surveillance,
territoriality and activity placement may need to be relied upon instead of access control
in these cases. The solution is to "do it smarter;" imaginative and innovative designing
can often overcome many physical constraints.
The Security Engineering Course points out that there is a significant cost savings
ifCPTED principles are incorporated into facilities at the planning stage ofthe facilities
process as opposed to trying to incorporated them in as an "afterthought." This is one
area that might be helped significantly if security personnel were more involved in the
facility planning process (NAVFAC, 1991). However, in order to achieve more
involvement between security and planning, some ofthe organizational constraints may
have to be overcome.
Organizational Constraints
Several ofthe preceding sections mentioned an apparent disconnect between
planning and security. Both the DOD Antiterrorism Handbook and the NAVFAC
Security Engineering Course give responsibility for security and antiterrorism almost
exclusively to security and intelligence agencies. As mentioned, while they do reference
some planning issues, there is very little mention ofplanners and facility personnel. The
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planning instruction does not mention antiterrorism at all and has only a minor mention
ofphysical security.
The disconnect between security and planning personnel is not limited to the
military. Recent surveys ofpolice and security personnel in the civilian community show
great frustration on their part about their lack of inclusion in the planning process
(Schneider, 1998.) And many civilian law enforcement official complain that they have a
difficult time getting architects and engineers to pay attention to CPTED initiatives (Post,
1995).
The disconnect between departments is also not specifically a Navy and DOD
problem The Department ofDefense is a huge organization and, as such, faces many of
the conflicts inherent in an entity of its size and complexity. In general, the tendency of
large organizations to compartmentalize is common. In many large organizations,
specific departments become territorial and do not want to share ideas with "other"
departments. Also, the larger an organization is, the more specialized its individual parts
tend to be. Both the size and the territoriality in an organization tend to make open
communication between the departments difficult to achieve (Hunt, 1972).
Other problems that may affect the incorporation ofCPTED into Navy force
protection include the natural conservatism of large organizations and the difficulty they
have in innovating. Large organizations change slowly. There also tends to be time
lapses between an event (an increase in terrorist activity, for example) and the solutions
put in place to change the event. While there are problems with the DOD and Navy
organizational systems, offering remedies to these problems is often easier said than
done. It may be easier to incorporate solutions on a smaller, facility specific scale than to
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affect policy in general. The JIATF-EAST case presented in Chapter 5 in an excellent
example ofthis principle.
Future Opportunities
There are several opportunities to improve future CPTED and antiterrorism
efforts in general. One important opportunity is the new version ofthe DOD 2000. 12H
handbook, which is due out this year. The handbook will be changed to a DOD Directive
rather than a handbook; and as a directive it will carry more weight. Although it is not
anticipated that the new directive will have more CPTED elements, this additional
emphasis on antiterrorism will provide military facilities with the opportunity to receive
added consideration for antiterrorism initiatives.
Security and Planning as a Team
There is a great opportunity, particularly in the Navy, for planning and security
personnel to work together. Experts such as Oscar Newman stress that "this kind of
planning goes awry when law enforcement tries it by itself' (Post, 1995, pg. 19).
Because Navy facilities, planning and security personnel are all part ofone organization,
they may be more successful in selling the idea of a joint planing/security partnership
than their civilian counterparts. Security courses and the DOD Handbook discuss
antiterrorism concepts, but it requires both planning and security personnel in order to




Another opportunity available is the cultivation and use ofpeople from the
community to help increase security. The Khobar Towers case contains an example
where a civilian policeman took the initiative to call a tow truck to remove the truck
containing the bomb. Unfortunately the call was not in time to help the situation.
However, the incident is insightful in that it shows that members ofthe outside
community can be helpful in observing and reporting suspicious happens around a
facility.
Getting the support ofthe base Commanding Officer (CO) and other influential
personnel is important in the implementation phase ofany project. Many base CO's have
great personal attachment and pride in the facility they are in charge of. This includes an
interest in the actual appearance ofthe facility. The aesthetic alternative to security that
CPTED provides can be a very popular concept in that it is both cost effective and
provides a pleasing appearance.
Summary
Experts agree that CPTED methods, such as setbacks, access control, and good
surveillance are some ofthe best ways to reduce the effect of a terrorist bombing
(Hinman, 1995). Both mechanical and organizational methods have their drawbacks.
The basic components of organizational security are human, and, as seen in past terrorist
attacks, they may not be as effective ifthey do not feel a personal stake in the territory
they are protecting.
Electrical and mechanical equipment can fail due to problems with power sources,
lack of maintenance, or for many other reasons. They can also be relied on too heavily.
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Terrorist experts warn that: "Overreliance on technology often produces mental
sloppiness, complacency, and - what may be the greatest threat to counterterrorist strike
forces - overconfidence. ...Under some circumstance, high-technology armaments and
equipment may even be counterproductive." (Livingstone, 1982, pg.198).
The use ofCPTED for antiterrorism is a relatively new concept. Several articles
contemplated whether the use ofCPTED techniques would have helped avert the
Oklahoma City tragedy (Post, 1995; Moreno, 1996). However, if the issue ofhaving
appropriate set-backs is disregarded, there are very few sources that specifically link
CPTED methods to antiterrorism.
While in some ways terrorism is a different kind of crime than that which CPTED
was designed to help prevent, in other ways it is very similar. CPTED has been relatively
successful in the originally intended use, so, in theory it should also help discourage
terrorism (Moreno, 1996). As history has demonstrated and as modern security experts
recommend, security should be done as a layered approach. CPTED is an additional
layer (conceptually or physically), and one that could be very valuable from the
standpoint ofboth the security ofthe complex, and the creation of a better environment in
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The formula used for relating safe distance to both overpressure and
fragmentation damage is given by:
D = KW13
Where:
D is the distance (or radius) in feet from the point of detonation that an over
pressure in psi is measured,
W is the weight of the explosive in pounds of TNT,
K is a numerical conversion factor which relates the pressure (in psi) to the
distance D.
The relationship between K and the overpressure in psi is given in Table F-3
where K is given in feet/(lb) 1/3 .
This equation can be used to determine the distance at which a certain
pressure is experienced if a weight of explosives equivalent to W pounds of
TNT is used. From Table F-l we can determine the amount of damage that
occurs to different structures from this overpressure. If the explosive is not




Car Bomb made of 1000 kg of Ammonium Nitrate / Fuel Oil (ANFO).
In English units: 2,205 lbs of ANFO.
1 lb of ANFO = .83 lbs of TNT
2,205 lbs x .83 = 1,830 lbs TNT
D = KW1/3
For an overpressure of 3 psi which could cause severe damage to the JIATF
East buildings and injuries to personnel cause by fragments and debris:
K = 20 ft/Ob) 1/3 (from table F-3)
VV= 1,830 lbs
D = (20) x (1,830) 1/3
D = 245 ft






Safe Blast (Overpressure) Distance
The K-factor of 300 has been established for determining the safe-blast distance. This K-
factor converts to a 0.007 psi value, the lowest level of damage caused by blast
overpressure.
Safe Frag Distance
The K-factor of 300 for light case munition and 500 for heavy case munition has been
established for determining the safe- frag distance. This K-factor converts to a fragment
velocity at which most fragments are traveling too slow to penetrate unprotected human
skin.
Table F-3. K Factors
































FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13 February 1997
EXTRACTED FROM NAVY EODB/ARMY TM/ATR FORCF TO 60A- 1 - 1 -4
(Revision 2)


















Roof rafter cracked 0.5- 1.5
Studs and sheathinq cracked 1.0-3.0





moderately buckled/joints separated 0.5- 1.0















Moderate crackling 3.0 - 4.0
Severe spallinq/wall displacement 6.0-8.0















Complete displacement 8- 10
Destruction 14-20
Blown down 304Steel towers
Personnel Temporary threshold ear damage 0.2*
Appendix F-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13 February 1997
Footnotes to table F-l
1. Frame failure will not occur if glass is thin and breaks easily.
2. Frame failure may occur if siding has been reinforced or strengthened.
3. For reinforced walls or those built between.rigid supports, pressures of 3.0 - 4.0 psi
are needed for damage/shattering.
4. Where explosive quantities are large, lesser pressures may destroy towers.
5. Temporary threshold ear damage may cause temporary loss of hearing
depending on peak impulse pressure, speed, and other factors.
EXTRACTED FROM NAVY EODB/ARMY TM/A1R FORCE TO 60A- 1-1-4
(Revision 2)
Appendix F-6








Some ofthe unique aspects of design option 1 (located in the insert section at the
back ofthis section) and the CPTED principles they illustrate included:
Territoriality
- Improved signage throughout the facility (included in all design options).
Surveillance
- Integration of lighting and CCTV into the design around the core buildings.
Access Control
- The use ofthe concrete based flagpoles as vehicle stops in front ofthe main entrance.
Developing secure parking areas (also Territoriality)
Regulating the secured parking through use ofgates and proximity card readers.
- Eliminating the road to the north ofthe core buildings.
Using boulders and palm trees as vehicle stops in the landscaping scheme around the
athletic field.





The addition of an external covered walkway to offer a secure solution to internal
employee/document circulation within the fence line that included entrances to all
four buildings. A secondary route through interiors of 291, 290, 289 and 1279 was
also provided. (This is also an example of territoriality, access control, and
surveillance.)
The redesigned athletic field, which included open space to include active recreation
such as football and other sport activities and integrated a landscaped jogging path
around the athletic field. (This is also an example ofterritoriality and surveillance.)
Maintenance
- Increased landscaping.
Redesigning the main entrance to the core buildings to include a ceremonial drive for
V.I. P. visits and redesigning the walkways and planters in front of Building 291 (this
is also an example of territoriality).
Comments and critiques on this design included a concern about truck access to
the loading dock on the north side ofbuilding 1279, and a concern about the location of
the dumpsters near the loading dock with respect to use by the service personnel. The
design did not address the Seminole Battery. There was a comment that more overhead
barrier were needed, so truck turnaround access would not be cut off An idea surfaced to
place the dumpsters and loading dock outside ofthe compound, but it was later decided
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to be impractical. The military personnel liked the athletic field and track in this option,
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Highlights of design option two (located in the insert section at the back ofthis
section), and the CPTED principles they illustrate included:
Territoriality
Improved signage throughout the facility (included in all design options).
Access Control
The realignment ofthe main entrance roads to a curvilinear orientation and the
installation of a series ofroundabout drop-offs to reduce approach speeds into the
complex.
Developing secure parking areas (also Territoriality)
Regulating the secured parking through use of gates and proximity card readers.
Eliminating the road to the north ofthe core buildings.
- The restricting of delivery truck traffic to Southard Street
- The closing ofCovington Street to vehicular through traffic.
The segregation ofthe main parking area through the use ofbollards.




- The redirection ofthe truck access to the proposed loading dock on building 1279 and
relocation ofthe dumpsters.
Activity Placement
- The canopied walkway to the northwest side ofthe complex to offer a secure solution
to internal employee/document circulation within the fence line. (This is also an
example of territoriality, access control, and surveillance.)
Maintenance
Increased landscaping.
- The clustering ofthe resort housing to minimize environmental impact to the beach.
- The creation of a covered ceremonial drive for dignitaries (this is also an example of
territoriality).
Comments and critiques on this design from the JIATF-EAST representatives
included concerns about the United Street entrance. They didn't think access by Truman
St. was possible (l
a
St. too narrow) so they mentioned having to use access through
Southard. There were also questions about ways to prevent direct access to the building
by speeding cars, even though the road was curved. The military personnel liked the
berms adjacent to the parking, but as cost was a big factor, they did not think earth
moving would be practical They liked the secure parking located next to the unsecured
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The main aspects of design option 3 (located in the insert section at the back of
this section) and the CPTED principles they illustrate included:
Territoriality
Improved signage throughout the facility (included in all design options)
- Creating "zones" by cutting offthe housing area from the rest ofbase, and by
separating the resort area from the work area.
Access Control
Using a retaining wall system to separate the parking from the building and to keep
cars from approaching the building.
- Regulating the secured parking through use ofgates and proximity card readers.
Making all parking areas inside the 3,000 psi zone controlled high security level
parking and controlling access on the roads inside the 3,000 psi zone (also
Territoriality).
Adding several new lots for additional parking including a new parking lot where
building 266 is now located.
Eliminating the road to the north ofthe core buildings.
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Creating a new Southard Street entrance to accommodate proposed BRAC plan
- Redirecting the truck access to the proposed loading dock on building 1 279 and
relocating the dumpsters.
Activity Placement
- Providing a secured walkway for pedestrian traffic to the southeast side ofthe JIATF
complex. (This is also an example of territoriality, access control, and surveillance.)
Maintenance
Increased landscaping.
Utilizing steel-fabricated fencing instead of chain link around the entrance.
Creating a formal entrance for VTP visits that includes the use of ceremonial fountains
(this is also an example of territoriality).
The military personnel liked the idea of splitting the compound into zones with
access to the work areas. Some ofthe personnel also liked the exterior covered walkway
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CO - Commanding Officer
CPTED - Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
DOD - Department of Defense
DOS - Department of State
EFA - Engineering Field Activity
EFD - Engineering Field Division
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
rTG - Interim Technical Guidance
JIATF-EAST - Joint Interagency Task Force East
LANTDFV - Atlantic Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
MCON - Military Construction
MWR - Moral, Welfare and Recreation Association
NAS - Naval Air Station
NAVFAC - Naval Facilities Engineering Command
PWC - Navy Public Work Center
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